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a b s t r a c t 
We introduce a theoretical model of the active fund management industry (AFMI) in which 
performance and size depend on the AFMI’s competitiveness (concentration). Under plau- 
sible assumptions, as AFMI’s concentration decreases, so do fund managers’ incentives for 
exerting effort in search of alpha. Consequently, managers produce lower gross alpha, and 
rational investors, inferring lower expected AFMI performance, allocate a smaller portion 
of their wealth to active funds. Empirically, we find that a decrease in the US mutual fund 
industry concentration over our sample period is associated with a decrease in its net al- 
pha and size (relative to stock market capitalization). 
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An active area of research in financial economics exam-
ines the massive size of the active fund management in-
dustry (AFMI) and the high compensation of its mangers,
despite its unimpressive historical performance. 1 Recent
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1 Studies examining active mutual fund performance include Jensen 
(1968), Gruber (1996), Carhart (1997), Brown et al. (1996), Daniel 
et al. (1997), Pastor and Stambaugh (2002), Wermers (2000), Cohen et al. 
(20 05), Kacperczyk et al. (20 05), Fama and French (2010), Glode (2011) , 
and Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) . Studies examining the relation be- 
tween active fund performance and size include Berk and Green (2004) , 
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ther concave or convex in AFMI concentration. performance is puzzling when gross alpha production is 
subject to decreasing returns to scale (see, for example, 
Berk and Green, 2004 ; BG and Pastor and Stambaugh, 
2012 ; PS). Intuitively, as more assets under management 
(AUM) chase opportunities, prices adjust, making gross al- 
pha harder to find. These insights lead to several interest- 
ing questions. For example, do other gross alpha produc- 
tion inputs play a significant role in determining AFMI size 
and performance? 
We posit that incentives of fund managers to exert 
effort in finding investment opportunities influence gross 
alpha production and that these incentives depend on 
AFMI concentration (a measure of its competitive environ- 
ment). 2 To formally analyze this, we introduce an AFMI 
model in which active fund managers choose (optimal) 
costly effort levels when competing over investment 
funds. In equilibrium, AFMI concentration levels influence 
optimal effort levels exerted by managers, which, in turn, 
influence AFMI performance and size. We find evidence, 
consistent with our model, that decreases in the concen- 
tration of the US mutual fund industry are associated with 
decreases in its performance and size (relative to stock 
market capitalization). 
In our model, gross alpha production by active man- 
agers depends on their fund sizes, optimal effort levels, 
and ability. We refer to ability as a measure of a fund man- 
ager’s decreasing returns to scale. That is, we ascribe man- 
agers with higher ability when they have “lower cost” for 
managing the same fund size. Competing managers max- 
imize profits by optimally choosing fees and costly effort 
levels, while offering net alpha (net of management fees) 
to investors. Mean-variance investors choose optimal port- 
folios of passive benchmarks and active funds (whose ex- 
pected net alphas are positive to compensate for active 
funds’ additional risk). 3 Investors’ pursuit of net alpha in- 
duces a positive relation between fund sizes and managers’ 
abilities. In equilibrium, all fund sizes adjust so that they 
offer similar expected net alphas to investors at break-even 
fees (sufficient to cover costs). 4 Any attempt to offer higher 
(lower) net alpha leads to insolvency (zero AUM allocation 
by investors). So, higher ability in our model is not asso- 
ciated with higher gross alpha or net alpha. Instead, it is 
associated with higher value added (gross alpha multiplied Chen et al. (2004), Yan (2008), Pastor and Stambaugh (2012) , and Pastor 
et al. (2015) . 
2 We use concentration and competition as opposites. Also, for simplic- 
ity and brevity, we use the term “AFMI concentration” for “AFMI market 
concentration” and “market concentration.”
3 While AFMI net alphas are positive in our model with risk-averse in- 
vestors, aggregate net alphas are zero-sum by construction, as they shift 
wealth between AFMI investors and other (unmodeled) investors. These 
unmodeled investors could be, for example, individuals with direct equity 
ownership (see Stambaugh, 2014 ). 
4 A fund-level decreasing returns scale does not necessarily imply a cor- 
relation between fund size and net alpha ( Berk and Green, 2004 ). While 
Pastor et al. (2015) find strong evidence of net alpha decreasing with size 
at industry level, they do not find a significant relation at the fund level. 
We also do not find a significant relation between fund net alpha and 
fund size (consistent with our model). The fund-level evidence in the lit- 
erature is mixed (see, for example, Grinblatt and Titman, 1989; Chen et 
al. 2004; Ferreira et al., 2013a, 2013b; Yan, 2008; Reuter and Zitzewitz, 
2013 ). 
Please cite this article as: D. Feldman, K. Saxena and J. Xu, Is the
Journal of Financial Economics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2by fund size; the Berk and van Binsbergen, 2015 measure 
of skill). 
In this equilibrium, we study the impact of AFMI con- 
centration on managerial costly effort, net alpha produc- 
tion, and AFMI size, all three endogenously determined. A 
key quantity that determines these relations is the direct 
benefits of effort, which we define as the difference be- 
tween productivities of managerial effort s (which measure 
opportunities to find mispriced assets by exerting effort) 
and managerial effort s’ cost s (such as wages and research 
costs). We find that if higher concentration increases direct 
benefits of effort, then higher concentration induces higher 
equilibrium expected net alphas and larger AFMI size. 
As the level of AFMI concentration decreases (or com- 
petition increases), the direct benefits of fund managers’ 
effort s decrease, and they reduce their effort s. This effort- 
level reduction captures fund managers’ optimal decision 
to invest less time and expenses, per dollar of AUM, on 
research and information acquisition, thereby holding less 
(informed) active positions. As a result, the funds produce 
lower gross alpha and provide lower net alpha to investors. 
AFMI size decreases because rational investors infer this 
lower net alpha and reduce their investment in the AFMI 
until they are indifferent between leaving an extra dollar 
in the AFMI and investing it in the passive benchmark. In 
summary, a decrease in AFMI concentration reduces the 
incentives of fund managers to exert effort, resulting in 
lower AFMI performance and smaller AFMI size. 
Recent empirical studies find that performance declines 
as AFMI size increases ( Pastor et al., 2015 ; PST) and that 
most of the growth in the mutual fund industry is due to 
the growth in the number of funds, not in the median fund 
size ( Berk and van Binsbergen, 2015) . When these empiri- 
cal findings are combined, they seem to support our the- 
oretical predictions that performance depends positively 
on AFMI concentration. 5 Our model provides three further 
predictions for empirical analysis. First, even when con- 
trolling for size, higher concentration levels are associated 
with an increase in AFMI performance. Second, AFMI size 
and effort levels increase in AFMI concentration. 6 Third, 
the AFMI expected net alphas and AFMI size are both ei- 
7 5 Other empirical studies relating mutual fund performance to com- 
petition include Wahal and Wang (2011), Khorana and Servaes (2011), 
Cremers et al. (2016) , and Hoberg et al. (2018) . Guercio and Reuter 
(2014) also find evidence consistent with the notion that weaker incen- 
tives due to lower competition faced by broker-sold funds lead to their 
lower performance. 
6 The technical conditions for such an equilibrium are, first, that 
higher concentration increases the gap between the marginal benefits and 
marginal costs of gross alpha production and, second, that the (further) 
sensitivity of this gap to increased effort levels does not reverse this prop- 
erty. See Lemma RA1(3) and Lemma RA1(5). 
7 Our model predicts that if equilibrium fund expected net alphas are 
concave in AFMI concentration, then AFMI’s benefits of effort are concave 
in AFMI concentration. Consequently, equilibrium AFMI size is also con- 
cave in AFMI concentration. On the other hand, if equilibrium AFMI size is 
convex in AFMI concentration, then the AFMI’s benefits of effort are con- 
vex in AFMI concentration and, consequently, equilibrium expected fund 
net alphas are convex in AFMI concentration. Note that the order of state- 
ments in the second (convex) case is different from that in the first case 
for reasons explained following Proposition RA3. 
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We evaluate three predictions in our empirical counter-
part for US AFMI. We find that, consistent with our model,
both AFMI size and net alphas are, on average, increas-
ing and concave with measures of AFMI concentration such
as the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index ( HHI ). 8 While effort is
largely unobservable, we suggest that aggregate manage-
rial effort affect s the average AFMI active share and track-
ing error. The reason is that any effort to outperform the
benchmark must involve taking positions that are different
from the benchmark (e.g., Cremers and Petajisto, 2009 ). We
find that both the average AFMI active share and tracking
error increase in concentration, consistent with our model
(assuming these measures proxy for effort). 9 
Our analysis is related to several recent papers, though
none of them addresses the question of how AFMI concen-
tration levels affect its performance and size. In particular,
our model incorporates key features from BG and PS. 
To the PS model, which presents an AFMI size–net al-
pha relation, we introduce two distinct and novel fea-
tures. The first is an AFMI concentration–alpha relation,
which also exists when controlling for the AFMI size–
net alpha relation modeled in PS. The second is an AFMI
concentration–size relation (for details, see Section 2.3 ). 
PS identify the AFMI equilibrium elegantly, without the
need to specify fund-level size or ability heterogeneity. Ig-
noring such heterogeneity, our model becomes the one in
PS if neither managers’ effort levels nor AFMI concentra-
tion affect managers’ search productivity or costs. 10 Even
when, in our model, the search productivity for mispriced
assets depends on effort levels, a special case of parameter
values leads to a solution in which the optimal allocated
effort is zero. 11 In this case as well, our model results be-
come as those in PS, where the AFMI net alpha and size
do not depend on AFMI concentration. 
Our model also incorporates fund-level decreasing re-
turns to scale, a feature in BG. In our model, this fea-8 In the real world, AFMI concentration is likely to be affected by other 
forces (e.g., macroeconomic, regulatory) that we do not model. For in- 
stance, policy can restrict or incentivize certain investors toward a nar- 
rowly defined menu of funds, thereby increasing concentration ( Hong, 
2018 ). For convenience and parsimony, we assume exogenous concen- 
tration levels in our baseline model. In addition, we examine how our 
main empirical measure of concentration, HHI, can be endogenously de- 
termined (see Section 2.4 ). 
9 Cremers and Petajisto (2009) show that fund-level active share pre- 
dicts fund performance and that this performance is strongly persistent. 
Brown and Davies (2017) argue that shirking managers could “jam the 
signal” in active share by taking uninformed bets to increase their per- 
ceived active share, generating a false sense of truly active management. 
However, such signal jamming behavior is more likely to be an issue if 
a measure of active share is tied with fund manager incentives, which is 
not likely for our active share sample period that ends in 2009, the year 
when Cremers and Petajisto (2009) was published. Also signal jamming is 
of more concern at the fund level than at the aggregate AFMI level, where 
information asymmetry and its associated signal jamming is less likely to 
be a concern. 
10 Analytically, effort levels do not affect alpha production in our model, 
if the third addend of the right side of Eq. (7) does not exist and if we 
abandon our cost function, Eq. (18) , in favor of defining funds’ fees to be 
net of funds’ management costs. 
11 For the technical conditions that lead to this case, see Proposition 
PS and its corollary. Intuitively, this is the case if, for all concentration 
levels, costs of efforts producing alphas exceed the benefits of the pro- 
duced alphas. 
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librium concentration levels by allowing fund size het-
erogeneity. This feature is not directly responsible for the
AFMI concentration–alpha relation in our model. For this
relation, managerial effort is essential. To see this, consider
the following alternative: What if we shut down the ef-
fort channel but keep the features of fund-level decreasing
returns to scale, as in BG, and industry-level decreasing re-
turns to scale, as in PS? In this case, any effect of fund-
level decreasing returns to scale on net alpha would be via
AFMI size. In this hypothetical model, concentration would
not influence net alpha (controlling for AFMI size). Intro-
ducing concentration and its influence on effort levels en-
ables us to model a distinct mechanism that influences net
alpha. 
The BG equilibrium is compatible with the case in our
model in which infinitely many small risk-neutral investors
compete. Here, the size of the fund endogenously ad-
justs to make the gross alpha equal the fee, so that ex-
pected net alpha is always zero. Even in this case, signifi-
cant differences exist between the models. For example, a
novel feature of our model is that AFMI size depends on
AFMI concentration even when investors are risk-neutral.
A higher AFMI concentration incentivizes managers to in-
crease effort levels. So, optimizing risk-neutral investors al-
locate more to the AFMI until they drive its net alpha to
zero. 
Another difference, compared with BG, is that managers
with more ability have larger fund sizes in our model.
More skilled managers receive more AUM until their gross
alphas are equal to those of less skilled managers. In equi-
librium, gross alpha and fees are the same across funds. So,
our model predicts that the cross-sectional distribution of
manager ability is reflected in the cross-sectional distribu-
tion of fund size and value added but not in gross alpha or
net alpha. This is consistent with the evidence in Berk and
van Binsbergen (2015) . The BG model does not make this
prediction: managers with more ability do not necessarily
manage larger funds. In BG, competitive pressures do not
force managers to choose the same fees, so a more skilled
manager is indifferent between more AUM with less fees
and less AUM with more fees (as long as their profits stay
the same). 12 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the
theoretical model; Section 3 describes tests of the model’s
predictions; Section 4 presents the empirical results; and
Section 5 concludes. 13 
2. Theoretical framework 
Within PS’s world, adopting their notation, we develop
a theoretical framework for modeling the effect of AFMI12 The definition of manager ability in BG is different from ours. It cor- 
responds to the magnitude of expected excess return (over the passive 
benchmark) earned on the first dollar actively managed by a fund. The 
reason that fund size can be unrelated to ability is, in BG as explained 
above, managers’ indifference between larger fund sizes and higher fee 
levels. Differences in the definition of ability do not play a role here. 
13 Two online appendices are on the journal webpage. 
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15 For example, Garvey et al. (2017) decompose fund strategies into a 
combination of orthogonal and generic insights and suggest that many 
funds invest partly in orthogonal insights and partly in generic insights 
that are common across funds. Investing in multiple fund managers acts 
to concentrate risk into generic ideas. 
16 In a more concentrated market, if a fund manager controls most of 
the industry resources and develops advanced strategies to produce gross concentration on fund managers’ effort levels, fund fees, 
fund performance, AFMI size, and potential direct benefits. 
2.1. Setting 
For brevity and parsimonious notation, we assume that 
variables and functions are real, continuous, and at least 
twice differentiable. Within a one-period market, there are 
two types of agents: fund managers of M funds, M > 1, and 
N investors, N ≥ 1. Acting competitively, each manager sets 
a proportional management fee and chooses an effort level 
to maximize the fund expected net alpha to attract invest- 
ments. In this section and Section 2.2 , we consider the 
case in which infinitely many small mean-variance risk- 
averse investors (henceforth, risk-averse investors) allocate 
their investments to maximize their portfolios’ Sharpe ra- 
tios. By infinitely many small investors we mean that N → ∞ 
and with investors’ finite wealth, their choices do not af- 
fect fund sizes. We also consider the case of infinitely 
many small risk-neutral investors (henceforth, risk-neutral 
investors). 
Our model follows and builds on that of PS. In this 
partial equilibrium, the passive benchmark portfolio’s re- 
turns are exogenously given and are unaffected by interac- 
tions between investors and managers. Managers’ outper- 
formance of the passive benchmark portfolio (i.e., gross al- 
phas), could come at the expense of other investors, who 
could be noise traders, liquidity seekers, misinformed, or 
irrational. 14 
2.1.1. Fund alpha and the returns process 
Following PS, r F , a vector of M funds’ returns in excess 
of the riskless rate that investors receive, follows the re- 
gression model 
r F = α + βr p + u , (1) 
where r F is an M × 1 vector with elements r F,i , i = 
1 , . . . , M; α, β, and u are M × 1 vectors; α is the vector of 
fund net alphas received by investors; and β is the vector 
of fund betas. The scalar r P is the excess return on the pas- 
sive benchmark portfolio, with mean μp and variance σ 2 p , 
and u is the residual vector, with elements that follow 
u i = x + ε i , i = 1 , . . . , M, (2) 
where ɛ i s are mean zero and variance σ
2 
ε idiosyncratic 
risks and are uncorrelated with each other, with x , and 
with r p . The common factor x has mean zero and variance 
of σ 2 x and is uncorrelated with r p . The values of μp , σ
2 
p , 
σ 2 ε , and σ
2 
x are strictly positive constants that are common 
knowledge to investors and managers. 
The benchmark-adjusted returns on the M funds that 
investors receive is 
r 
= α + u . (3) 
As in PS [see their Eqs. (2) and (3) ], the factor struc- 
ture in Eqs. (1) –(3) means that the benchmark-adjusted 
returns of AFMI funds are correlated. An economic ratio- 
nale for a common component x in this factor structure 14 Please see the detailed discussion in PS (p. 749). 
Please cite this article as: D. Feldman, K. Saxena and J. Xu, Is the
Journal of Financial Economics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2is that similar opportunities are likely to be identified by 
AFMI funds, resulting in correlated benchmark-adjusted re- 
turns (see also PS, pp. 746–747). 15 Technically, this com- 
mon component x is necessary to guarantee that investors 
in AFMI portfolios cannot enjoy expected net alphas with- 
out increasing their risk, the variance of their portfolios. 
(This is the case because they can, plausibly, well diver- 
sify the ɛ i s in their AFMI returns.) That is, had the common 
component x not existed, the risks associated with invest- 
ing in AFMI funds could be fully diversified away by invest- 
ing in many of them while retaining the benefits of their 
positive expected net alphas. 
Each element in α has the following structure: 
αi = a − b 
S 
W 
+ A ( e i ; H ) − f i , (4) 
where a and b are positive, unknown scalar parameters, 
where b is the industry level decreasing returns to scale 
rate; S is the aggregate size of the active management in- 
dustry and is equal to the sum of all the funds’ sizes (i.e., 
S = ∑ M i =1 s i ); W is the total wealth managed actively and 
passively and is equal to S plus the amount invested in the 
passive benchmark; A ( e i ; H ) is the productivity of manager 
i s proportional effort e i ∈ [0, ∞ ) to increase gross alpha un-
der AFMI concentration H ; and f i is the proportional fee 
charged by manager i . 
The expression for net alpha in PS corresponding to 
Eq. (4) does not contain the A ( e i ; H ) term, which captures
the alpha production function due to extra effort under 
AFMI concentration H . This is because PS focus on study- 
ing how investor beliefs about the unknown parameters a 
and b influence AFMI size. We build on their findings and 
study how AFMI concentration influences fund managers’ 
incentives to exert costly effort, thereby influencing AFMI 
size and alpha. 
2.1.2. Productivity of manager effort 
We assume that A ( e i ; H ), the productivity of effort un-
der H , is the same across funds and has the following func- 
tional characteristics: zero for zero effort, increasing and 
concave in effort, increasing in AFMI concentration, and 
positive cross-partial derivatives with respect to effort and 
AFMI concentration. The assumption that links concentra- 
tion to gross alpha is that the more concentrated AFMI is, 
the relatively more investment (mispriced) opportunities 
there are and the more marginally efficient is the use of 
industry resources. 16 Thus, managers can generate a higher 
increment in gross alpha for a given effort level e i . 
2.1.3. AFMI concentration 
Our main analysis assumes that H is a known ex- 
ogenous scalar parameter because it depends mainly on alphas, other funds can mimic this fund’s strategy and produce higher 
gross alphas given a particular effort level. So this assumption is still valid 
when a dominant fund in the market controls the majority of resources. 
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some exogenous factors. For example, industrial organiza-
tion theory posits that AFMI concentration depends not
only on the number of incumbents, but also on threats
of entry, activity-limiting regulation, and the competitive-
ness of related industries (see, for example, Claessens and
Laeven, 2003 ). (In Section 2.4 , we examine endogenous
measures of AFMI concentration.) Without loss of general-
ity, we assume that H ∈ [0, 1). If H = 0 , there are infinitely
many small funds in the market, and the market is fully
competitive. If H = 1 , the market is monopolistic. If fund
managers are competing (the case we consider), H belongs
to [0, 1). 
2.1.4. Expected alpha and investors’ information about 
unknown parameters 
The parameters a and b in Eq. (4) are positive, un-
known scalar parameters. The parameter a represents the
expected return on an initial small fraction of wealth
invested in active management, net of any proportional
costs. The parameter b is the industry level decreasing re-
turns to scale rate. As in PS, the first and second condi-
tional moments of a and b are 
E 
([
a 
b 
]∣∣∣∣D ) = [ ˆ aˆ b 
]
(5)
and 
var 
([
a 
b 
]∣∣∣∣D ) = [σ 2 a σab σab σ 2 b 
]
, (6)
where D denotes investors’ information set. 17 
As we do not focus on the effects of σ ab on the equi-
librium, we assume that σab = 0 . 18 In other words, condi-
tional on current information, we assume that how ˆ a devi-
ates from a is unrelated to how ˆ b deviates from b . Finally,
with f i being a proportional management fee charged by
manager i , the fund’s expected net alpha is 19 
E ( α | D ) = ˆ a − ˆ b S + ˆ A ( e ; H ) − f . (7)i 
W 
i i 
17 See PS [p. 747, Eqs. (5) and (6) ]. 
18 We assume that σab = 0 , but we note that the value of σ ab affects 
the equilibrium results because it affects portfolio risks. If σ ab (in abso- 
lute value) is large relative to other risk sources, such as σ 2 a , σ
2 
b 
, and σ 2 x , 
changes in investors’ wealth allocations to funds would induce changes in 
their portfolio risks, affecting in turn their optimal demands. This would 
make our theoretical results in Propositions RA3 and RA4 more complex. 
We believe that consequences of such an analysis would not be directly 
material to the issues that we explore here and would obfuscate the anal- 
ysis. We, thus, assume that the precisions of estimates of a and b, condi- 
tional on current information, are not closely related, making σ ab → 0. 
19 Investors observe the passive benchmark and the AFMI funds’ returns. 
The difference between these returns comes from three components: net 
alphas, the common risk factor, and idiosyncratic risks. As the distribu- 
tions of the common risk and idiosyncratic risk are common knowledge, 
investors know the likelihood function of the net alphas. Given prior be- 
liefs of net alphas, they form posteriors and update their beliefs. In our 
one-period model, there is no dynamic Bayesian updating, but we sug- 
gest that investors reached a fixed-point equilibrium. Further, because in- 
vestors observe f i , H, S and W , they can also infer A ( e i , H ). Here, when 
equilibrium optimal effort levels of all managers are the same, the esti- 
mate ˆ A ( e i ; H ) could be subsumed in ˆ a. In equilibria when managers’ op- 
timal effort levels differ, the estimates ˆ A i ( e i ; H ) , could be subsumed in f i . 
For simplicity and brevity, we depress the notation of ˆ A ( e i ; H ) in favor of 
A ( e i ; H ) and follow the PS formulation. 
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Let δj denote the M × 1 vector of weights that investor
j places on the M funds, with elements δ j,i , i = 1 , . . . , M.
Thus, investor j ’s excess return is 
r j = δj T r F + 
(
1 − δj T ιM 
)
r p , (8)
where ιM is an M × 1 vector with elements equal to one,
and superscript T is a transpose operator. Following PS (p.
750 and footnote 7), we assume that all funds have beta
loadings on the benchmark equal to one [i.e., β, as defined
in Eq. (1) , fulfills, β = ιM ]. With funds’ holding unit beta
portfolios, the choice variable δj represents investor j ’s ex-
posure to the active part in the AFMI in excess of his or her
holding of the passive benchmark portfolio. As in PS, this
assumption allows parsimonious modeling of the active or
passive choice. 
Based on Eqs. (1) and (8) , we have 20 
r j = r p + δj T ( α + u ) . (9)
Further, we have 
E 
(
r j | D 
)
= μp + δj T E ( α| D ) , ∀ j, (10)
and 
Var 
(
r j | D 
)
= σ 2 p + 
[
σ 2 a + σ 2 x + σ 2 b 
(
S 
W 
)2 ](
δj 
T ιM 
)2 
+ σ 2 ε 
(
δj 
T δj 
)
, ∀ j. (11)
We first focus on the case of infinitely many ( N → ∞ )
small mean-variance risk-averse investors, none of whom
can affect fund sizes. We also examine the case of infinitely
many small risk-neutral investors, facilitating comparison
with BG model. Investors’ investment in the AFMI dilutes
fund expected returns due to decreasing returns to scale in
funds. Mean-variance risk-averse investors face risk-return
tradeoffs in marginal allocations. Investor j ’s objective is to
maximize the portfolio’s Sharpe ratio by choosing portfolio
weights, δj , j = 1 , . . . M. 
Max 
δj 
E 
(
r j | D 
)√ 
Var 
(
r j | D 
) , (12)
subject to 
δT j ιM ≤ 1 (13)
and 
δ j, i ≥ 0 , ∀ i. (14)
The argument of the objective function in Eq. (12) is
the ratio of Eqs. (10) and (11) . Condition (13) is a form
of wealth constraint, saying that investors cannot borrow
from the passive benchmark to invest in the AFMI. Condi-
tion (14) says that there is no short sale of funds. Also, as
we assume that there are no marginal diversification ben-
efits across funds, we set the idiosyncratic risk of investor
j ’s portfolio, σ 2 ε δj 
T δj to be negligible (that is, zero) when20 Eqs. (8) and (9) are similar to Eqs. (10) and (11) in PS. However, our 
functional forms, represented by variables in these equations (such as 
α, r F , δj , r j ), are different. 
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solving the optimization problem (12) . 21 Because the equi- 
librium is symmetric, we have 
δ∗T j ιM = S/W, ∀ j. (15) 
2.1.6. Fund manager’s problem 
f i is the proportional fee charged by manager i . The 
manager sets this fee considering its effect on the fund’s 
size. The manager also chooses the level of costly propor- 
tional effort to exert in order to find mispriced assets and 
produce additional gross alpha using A ( e i ; H ), which de- 
pends on AFMI concentration H . We define manager i ’s 
average (per dollar) cost to produce alpha as C i ( e i , s i ; H ). 
Therefore, manager i ’s economic profit is 
s i 
(
f i − C i ( e i , s i ; H ) 
)
(16) 
and, for fund i to survive, 
f i − C i ( e i , s i ; H ) ≥ 0 . (17) 
We assume that average cost functions, C i ( e i , s i ; H ), con- 
tain three independent positive scalar components: c 0, i , 
the average cost for fund i to operate in the market be- 
fore receiving investment and before manager i spends ef- 
fort; c 1, i s i , the average cost related to fund i ’s size, s i ; and 
c 2, i ( e i ; H ), the average cost of manager i ’s effort under a 
particular AFMI concentration. 22 That is, 
 
i ( e i , s i ; H ) = c 0 , i + c 1 , i s i + c 2 , i ( e i ; H ) . (18) 
Eq. (18) is also manager i ’s per dollar cost function, 
which, when multiplied by the fund size, s i , gives his or 
her total cost function. The coefficient c 1, i , then, induces 
a nonlinear (quadratic) increase in manager i ’s total cost 
function, making it convex in s i and representing the ex- 
tent of decreasing returns to scale in funds’ gross alpha 
production. This fund cost model is consistent with that 
of BG, who assume decreasing returns to scale at the fund 
level. 
Simplifying, we assume that c 0, i s, and c 2 ( e i ; H )s are the 
same across funds (we, thus, drop the subscript i ) but that 
c 1, i s are different across funds. Differences in the fund- 
level decreasing returns to scale parameters c 1, i measure 
differences in the rate at which managers’ costs in gener- 
ating gross alpha increase with size. 
We now introduce two terms, an AFMI’s individual 
manager skill and AFMI’s aggregate skill. In our model, 
c 1 , i 
−1 is the source of heterogenous manager ability or 
skill. A more skilled manager is one who has lower to- 
tal variable costs of active management for the same AUM 
and gross alpha. We define AFMI aggregate skill as the sum 
of individual managers’ skills, 
∑ M 
i =1 ( c 1 , i 
−1 ) . In our model, 
AFMI is more skilled when the sum of its mangers’ skills 
is higher. 21 Here, too, we adopt PS notation. Note that σ 2 ε δj 
T δj = σ 2 ε δj T I δj , where 
I is an M × M identity matrix and σ 2 ε I stands for the covariance matrix. 
22 To simplify our model, we assume no interaction between effort lev- 
els and size in the average cost function because it is unlikely that fund 
size affects managers’ per dollar effort. We also assume no interaction 
between concentration and size in the average cost function because it is 
unlikely that concentration affects managers’ average cost sensitivities to 
fund sizes. Even if these interacting effects do exist, they tend to be small 
in comparison with effects of other terms in the average cost function. 
Please cite this article as: D. Feldman, K. Saxena and J. Xu, Is the
Journal of Financial Economics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2We show that higher AFMI’s aggregate skill corresponds 
to higher AFMI size and that higher individual fund man- 
ager skill, relative to other managers, correspond to a 
higher relative size of their fund. (See Proposition RA1 and 
the discussion following Lemma RA1 .) 
We assume that the function c 2 ( e i ; H ) has zero for zero
effort and is increasing and convex in effort. 
The average cost function implies that as fund i ’s size, 
s i , increases, manager i ’s average cost increases because 
larger trades are associated with larger price impacts and 
higher execution costs and because of other factors that 
create diseconomies of scale in operation. c 1, i is the av- 
erage cost sensitivity to fund i ’s size. Adding the three cost 
function components shows that the average cost function 
is increasing and convex in effort. 
We do not specify whether costs are increasing or de- 
creasing in concentration. When costs are decreasing in 
concentration, the advantage of higher concentration is 
twofold: more opportunities and lower costs. When costs 
do not change as a function of concentration, the ad- 
vantage of increasing opportunities due to an increase in 
concentration is left unmitigated. Moreover, we show in 
Lemma RA1 that even increasing costs in concentration, for 
the plausible parameters set, perhaps do not fully mitigate 
the advantages of the increasing opportunities. 
We assume no fixed costs for several reasons. First, 
fixed costs are lower in comparison with the costs that 
we model and, we believe, do not affect our analysis. 23 
Moreover, the larger funds, with fixed costs that are rela- 
tively lower, determine AFMI concentration. In addition, as 
we focus on modeling decreasing returns to scale in gross 
alpha production, positive fixed costs could obfuscate this 
property. 24 
With these assumptions, manager i ’s problem is 
Max 
e i , f i 
s i 
(
f i − C i ( e i , s i ; H ) 
)
(19) 
subject to e i ≥ 0 and f i ≥ 0. 25 
2.1.7. Information structure 
We follow the information structure of PS when rel- 
evant and extend it, in spirit, to the new model struc- 
ture that we introduce here. Model parameters and func- 
tional forms are common knowledge to managers and in- 
vestors, with the following exceptions. The values of a and 
b are unknown, but their first two moments specifications 
are common knowledge. The values of the parameters of 
managers’ cost functions and alpha production functions 
are private information (manager i ’s knows his or her cost 
and production functions). Sensitivities (assumptions on 23 Fixed costs to manage funds, such as registration fees and equipment 
expenditure, are usually small in comparison with variable costs related 
to employees’ salaries and managers’ compensation. 
24 A nonzero fixed cost and decreasing returns to scale in gross alpha 
production (i.e., costs component that are increasing and convex in fund 
size) would induce an average cost function that is U-shaped in fund size. 
Thus, under some cases this can induce instances of increasing returns to 
scale in gross alpha production. 
25 For simplicity and brevity, we omit the condition in Eq. (17) from the 
problem statement as it is implied by the optimization and, thus, is not 
necessary. 
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derivatives) of cost functions and alpha production func-
tions are common knowledge. 
2.2. Equilibrium 
For the AFMI equilibrium, we begin by discussing
why the manager’s optimization problem is equivalent to
the problem of maximizing the expected net alpha. The
presentation of the latter problem helps to conveniently
describe the AFMI equilibrium. Our risk-averse investors
invest only in funds that offer the highest expected net
alphas. Fund managers, in turn, compete over expected
net alphas to attract investments. Manager i ’s problem
becomes 
Max 
e i , f i 
E ( αi | D ) (20)
subject to f i − C i ( e i , s i ; H ) ≥ 0 , e i ≥ 0 , and f i ≥ 0 . 
The online Main Appendix provides proof of the man-
agers’ maximization problems equivalence and also shows
that solving these problems leads to an AFMI unique Nash
equilibrium. The proof intuition is as follows. Under com-
petition, funds that offer lower expected net alphas lose all
investments. The possibility (threat) that other managers
will improve their expected net alphas induces all man-
agers to maximize expected net alphas to survive. Thus,
funds offer similar expected net alphas in a unique Nash
equilibrium. We are able to demonstrate that this aspect of
the equilibrium, which is similar to that in PS, holds under
various concentration levels, endogenous costly effort lev-
els, and endogenous fund sizes. 
To further study the equilibrium, we define the direct
benefits of effort function of manager i as 
B ( e i ; H ) = A ( e i ; H ) − c 2 ( e i ; H ) , ∀ i, (21)
B ( e i ; H ) captures the direct benefit from effort exerted in
active fund management, in terms of increase in gross al-
pha production minus the effort cost. We should interpret
benefits generally, allowing them to be positive or nega-
tive. Whether manager i ’s marginal direct benefits of ini-
tial effort are positive [i.e., B e i ( 0 ; H ) > 0 , ∀ H] is an impor-
tant condition affecting the equilibrium. If this condition
is not met, our equilibrium becomes the one in PS (see
Proposition PS in Section 2.3 ). Whether the sensitivity of
manager i ’s direct benefits, at optimal effort, is positive
[i.e., 
dB ( e ∗
i 
;H ) 
dH 
> 0 ] or not is also an important condition af-
fecting the equilibrium. 26 
Also, the AFMI active search for net alphas could have
indirect effects that we do not model here. It could drive
security prices toward their true values, induce firms
to improve governance and performance and to reduce
agency costs, and induce transfer of wealth from less pro-
ductive firms or investors to more productive ones. Here,
as in the literature, gross alphas are zero-sum. (See, for
example PS, pp. 748–750, including footnote 6, and refer-
ences therein, and our footnote 4.) This is the case regard-
less of whether any manager’s direct and or indirect bene-fits are nonzero or zero. 
26 See, for example, Proposition RA3 and the proof intuition to it. 
 
 
Please cite this article as: D. Feldman, K. Saxena and J. Xu, Is the
Journal of Financial Economics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2We are now ready to characterize the AFMI equilibrium
for risk-averse investors, induced by managers choosing
optimal effort levels and optimal fees. That is, we charac-
terize AFMI equilibrium expected net alphas, Sharpe ratios,
effort levels, fee rates, direct benefits of effort, AFMI size,
and fund market shares. In Proposition RA0 , we formally
state the AFMI Nash equilibrium. In Proposition RA1 , we
describe the qualitative properties of this equilibrium. In
Lemma RA1 , we describe technical properties of the AFMI
equilibrium, used to prove Propositions RA0 and RA1 . 
In Propositions RA0–RA4, PS , and RN1 , Corollaries to
Propositions RA2 and PS , and Lemma RA1 , we assume in-
finitely many mean-variance risk-averse investors. 
We first define AFMI’s equilibrium optimal allocations.
Let e ∗ be an M × 1 vector with managers’ optimal effort al-
locations, e ∗
i 
, f ∗ be an M × 1 vector with managers’ optimal
fee allocations, f ∗
i 
, and δ∗ be an M × N matrix with vectors
of investors’ optimal wealth weights allocations to funds,
δ∗
j 
. 
Proposition RA0 . Unique Nash equilibrium . 
There exists an AFMI unique Nash equilibrium, { e ∗, f ∗, δ∗} .
Proof of Proposition RA0 . See the online Main Appendix.
The proof intuition is below. 
Proposition RA1 . For manager i, i = 1 , . . . , M, if initial ef-
fort inputs generate positive direct benefits of effort, then, in
the AFMI equilibrium induced by managers choosing optimal
effort-fee combinations, ( e ∗
i 
, f ∗
i 
) , AFMI size, S / W, and AFMI
fund market shares, s i / S , ∀ i, adjust such that the following
eight properties are satisfied. 
1. Competition drives managers’ economic profits to zero, so
they can charge only break-even fees. 
2. Higher managers’ aggregate skill results in higher AFMI
size. 
3. Higher manager’s relative skill results in higher AFMI fund
market share (relative fund size). 
4. Managers offer the same market competitive expected net
alphas. 
5. Managers offer the same market competitive Sharpe ra-
tios. 
6. Investors hold the same AFMI portfolio weights (which are
proportional to AFMI fund sizes). 
7. Equilibrium effort levels and fees are the same across
funds. 
8. Equilibrium AFMI’s direct benefits of effort are the same
across funds. 
Proof of Proposition RA1 . See the online Main Appendix.
The proof intuition is below. 
To prove Proposition RA1 , we use the seven results of
Lemma RA1 , which characterize more specific properties of
the AFMI equilibrium. 
Lemma RA1 . For manager i, i = 1 , . . . , M, if initial ef-
fort inputs generate positive direct benefits of effort [ i.e. ,
B e i (0 ; H) > 0 , ∀ H], the equilibrium, induced by managers,
choosing optimal effort-fee combinations ( e ∗
i 
, f ∗
i 
) , has the fol-
lowing seven properties.  active fund management industry concentrated enough? 
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27 The condition in inequality ( 26 ) is equivalent to the condition that 
a > 0 in PS. See PS (p. 747) for further discussion and insights. 1. Fees are equal to costs: 
f ∗i − C i (e ∗i , s i ; H) = 0 , ∀ i. (22) 
2. The impact of marginal efforts on gross alpha is set equal 
to the marginal average costs of effort. Thus manager i’s 
marginal direct benefits of effort under the optimal effort 
level are zero). 
A e i 
(
e ∗i ; H 
)
− c 2 e i 
(
e ∗i ; H 
)
= B e i 
(
e ∗i ; H 
)
= 0 , ∀ i. (23) 
3. When concentration is higher, equilibrium optimal effort 
levels are higher (lower) if and only if higher concentra- 
tion induces a larger (smaller) marginal effort impact on 
gross alphas than on costs. Or 
e ∗′ i ( H ) ≥ 0 ( < 0 ) i f f A e i , H 
(
e ∗i ; H 
)
− c 2 e i , H 
(
e ∗i ; H 
)
≥ 0 ( < 0 ) , where e ∗′ i ( H ) 
= d e ∗i /d H. (24) 
4. Whether higher concentrations induce higher equilibrium 
optimal fees depends on whether they induce an increase 
in equilibrium AFMI sizes and whether they induce an in- 
crease in equilibrium optimal effort levels. 
5. When concentrations are higher, equilibrium manager i’s 
direct benefits of effort are higher (lower) if and only if 
higher concentrations induce a larger (smaller) impact on 
gross alphas than on costs. 
6. Pairwise relative fund sizes, s i / s j , ∀ i , j, are inversely 
proportional to their corresponding cost coefficients, 
c 1, i / c 1, j , ∀ i , j (where c 1, i represents the intensity of 
fund-level decreasing returns to scale in gross alpha 
production). 
7. AFMI fund market shares, s i / S’s, are 
s i 
S = ( c 1 , i 
∑ M 
j=1 
( c 1 , j 
−1 ) ) −1 , ∀ i . 
Proof of Proposition RA1 and Lemma RA1 . See the online 
Main Appendix. 
The proof intuition of Propositions RA0, RA1 and 
Lemma RA1 is as follows. 
Competing for investments, managers maximize fund 
expected net alphas by choosing optimal effort levels and 
fees, earning zero economic profits (break-even fees) in 
equilibrium. If managers increase fees, they would lower 
fund expected net alphas and lose all investments. If 
managers decrease fees, they would become insolvent, 
incurring negative cash flows (costs higher than fees). 
Deviating from equilibrium effort level would also induce 
a loss of investments (if decreasing effort) or insolvency (if 
increasing effort). Therefore, managers have no incentive 
to deviate. 
Also, with no diversification benefits across funds, man- 
agers who attempt to provide higher expected net alphas 
attract investments. Consequently, due to decreasing re- 
turns to scale in performance, on the one hand, and in- 
creasing fund costs, on the other hand, alpha gains are 
more than mitigated by a (break-even) fees increase, re- 
sulting in an overall decrease in expected net alpha. Thus, 
in equilibrium, the allocation of investments, or fund sizes, 
set expected net alphas to be equal across funds. If fund 
managers cannot produce the AFMI highest expected net 
alpha, even for an infinitesimal fund size, they lose all in- 
vestments and go out of the market. Please cite this article as: D. Feldman, K. Saxena and J. Xu, Is the
Journal of Financial Economics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2In addition, as funds have the same expected net al- 
phas, they have the same expected returns. As the source 
of fund returns’ variance is the same across funds, the fund 
return variance is the same across funds. Therefore, man- 
agers offer the same competitive Sharpe ratio. Because in- 
vestors cannot obtain a higher Sharpe ratio, they have no 
incentives to deviate. 
These result in a unique Nash equilibrium in which 
neither investors nor managers have incentives to deviate 
from their chosen strategies. 
If higher concentrations induce a higher (lower) 
marginal effort impact on gross alphas than a marginal 
effort impact on costs, managers optimally choose higher 
(lower) effort levels in producing fund net alphas. If 
higher concentrations induce higher equilibrium optimal 
effort levels, managers’ costs are driven higher, resulting in 
higher break-even fees. In addition, higher concentrations 
have two effects on manager i ’s direct benefits of effort. 
First, they directly affect the levels of gross alphas pro- 
duction function and of costs, A ( e i ; H ) and c 2 ( e i ; H ), be-
ing a parameter of each of these functions. Second, they 
change the equilibrium optimal effort levels, consequently 
changing the levels of gross alphas and costs. In equilib- 
rium, the latter (net) effect is zero because managers keep 
increasing effort levels until the marginal effort impact 
on gross alphas is equal to the marginal effort impact on 
costs. Thus, the effect of higher concentration through ef- 
fort on gross alphas is canceled out by its effects on costs. 
Therefore, in equilibrium (as the net second effect is zero), 
changes in the concentration level affect gross alphas and 
costs through the (direct) first effect only. Consequently, 
if higher concentration levels induce higher direct impacts 
on gross alphas than on costs, manager i ’s direct benefits 
of effort increase in concentration levels. 
Managers’ different costs of producing gross alphas 
(skills) induce different fund sizes in equilibrium. A sepa- 
ration exists between the determination processes of AFMI 
size (that is, AFMI’s weight in total wealth, S / W ) and AFMI
fund market shares (that is, relative fund sizes within 
AFMI). The former is driven by managers’ aggregate skill 
(cost) and the latter by managers’ relative skills (costs). In 
other words, how investors weight the funds inside the 
AFMI, or investors’ optimal AFMI portfolio, is unaffected 
by how investors weight the AFMI as a whole relative to 
the passive benchmark. This separation property facilitates 
later results. 
For convenience in describing the equilibrium in 
Propositions RA2 and RA3 , we define the equilibrium opti- 
mal expected net alphas of an initial marginal investment 
in the AFMI (when S = 0 ) as X( e ∗
i 
, H ) . Quantitatively, 
X 
(
e ∗i ; H 
) = ˆ a + A (e ∗i ; H ) − [c 0 + c 2 (e ∗i ; H )]. (25) 
For the AFMI to exist, we must have positive expected 
net alphas for initial infinitesimal investments into it: 27 
X 
(
e ∗i ; H 
)
> 0 , ∀ H. (26) 
If inequality (26) is violated, investors receive no advantage 
in diverting funds from the passive index to the AFMI. Also,  active fund management industry concentrated enough? 
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28 Where S/W = 1 , it is the case that S / W is unrelated to industry con- 
centration, higher concentration induces higher (lower) equilibrium ex- 
pected net alphas if and only if higher concentration induces a larger 
(smaller) impact on gross alphas than on costs, and equilibrium expected 
net alphas are concave (convex), in concentration, if and only if the equi- to offer meaningful results, we assume that initial marginal
allocations of effort generate positive AFMI direct benefits
of effort; that is, 
B e i ( 0 ; H ) > 0 , ∀ i, ∀ H, (27)
such that the optimal effort e ∗
i 
is positive, finite, and at-
tainable, i.e., B e i ( e 
∗
i 
; H ) = 0 , e ∗
i 
< K, ∀ i, ∀ H for some positive
constant K . We focus on the case in which the optimal ef-
fort is positive. 
As in PS (see their Proposition 2), the explicit analytic
solutions for S / W are solutions of a cubic equation and are
cumbersome. Proposition RA2 presents the cubic equation
and its corollary presents properties of its solution. 
Proposition RA2 . Equilibrium optimal allocations . 
For i = 1 , 2 , . . . , M, 
1. E( αi | D ) | { e ∗, f ∗, δ∗} > 0 ; and 
2. when N → ∞ , the equilibrium optimal S / W is either one
or a real positive solution (smaller than one) of the fol-
lowing first-order condition (a cubic equation) of the
investors’ problem [ Eqs. (12) –(14) ]. After we substitute
δ∗T 
j 
ιM = S/W , 
−γ σ 2 b 
(
S 
W 
)3 
−
⎡ ⎣ γ σ 2 a + γ σ 2 x + ̂  b + 
( 
M ∑ 
i =1 
c 1 , i 
−1 
) −1 
W 
⎤ ⎦ S 
W 
+ X 
(
e ∗i ; H 
)
= 0 , (28)
where γ
= μp /σ 2 p . 
Proof of Proposition RA2 . See the online Main Appendix. 
The intuition of Proposition RA2 is as follows. Investors
allocate investments to funds based on their risk-return
tradeoffs. Investing wealth in the AFMI increases a portfo-
lio’s risk, so they choose to limit these investments, leav-
ing E( αi | D ) | { e ∗, f ∗, δ∗} > 0 . The risk-return tradeoff of poten-
tially investing the last dollar, the dollar that would drive
fund expected net alphas to zero, is in the variance favor.
That is, the marginal cost of risk, of investing this last dol-
lar, is higher than the marginal benefit of the gained net
alpha. This prevents optimizing risk-averse investors from
allocating it to the AFMI, leaving fund expected net alphas
to be positive. The properties of the cubic equation guar-
antee exactly one real positive root. If the positive root is
larger than one, then S/W = 1 . 
We can now write the following corollary, characteriz-
ing AFMI equilibrium relations between performance and
size, and between the rate of returns to scale decrease and
size. 
Corollary to Proposition RA2 . For large enough W, such that
S / W < 1 . 
1. Higher equilibrium optimal expected net alphas of an ini-
tial marginal investment in the AFMI induce a larger equi-
librium AFMI size relative to total wealth; and 
2. A higher rate of decrease in aggregate AFMI’s re-
turns to scale [fund level and industry level; ˆ b +
( 
∑ M 
i =1 c 1 , i 
−1 ) −1 W ] induces a smaller equilibrium AFMIsize . 
Please cite this article as: D. Feldman, K. Saxena and J. Xu, Is the
Journal of Financial Economics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2Proof of Corollary to Proposition RA2 . See the online Main
Appendix. 
The intuition of this corollary is as follows. A higher
level of equilibrium optimal expected net alpha of an ini-
tial marginal investment, X( e ∗
i 
, H ) , attracts more invest-
ments to the AFMI. Also, ˆ b is the industry level ex-
pected decreasing returns to scale rate at the coming
from the alpha production function, based on current in-
formation, whereas ( 
∑ M 
i =1 c 1 , i 
−1 ) −1 W can be regarded as
the equilibrium decreasing returns to scale factor coming
from AFMI managers’ costs of alpha production (calculated
by aggregating all the fund average cost sensitivities to
size, c 1, i ’s). The latter decreasing returns to scale factor,
( 
∑ M 
i =1 c 1 , i 
−1 ) −1 W , is inversely proportional to AFMI’s ag-
gregate skill. Thus, the factor ˆ b + ( ∑ M i =1 c 1 , i −1 ) −1 W can be
regarded as the combined decreasing returns to scale fac-
tor. Investors invest less in funds if the effect of decreasing
returns to scale is stronger in the AFMI. 
Proposition RA3 offers comparative statics, which un-
derlie our main empirical analysis. 
Proposition RA3 . AFMI size and expected net alphas sensi-
tivities to concentration . 
When S / W < 1 , we have the following results. 28 
1. Higher concentration induces larger (smaller) equilibrium
AFMI size and higher (lower) equilibrium expected net al-
phas if and only if higher concentration induces a larger
(smaller) impact on gross alphas than on costs. 
2. Concave, in concentration, equilibrium direct benefits of
effort function indicates concave, in concentration, equi-
librium AFMI size. (Convex, in concentration, equilibrium
AFMI size indicates convex, in concentration, equilibrium
direct benefits of effort function.) 
3. Concave, in concentration, equilibrium expected net al-
phas indicates concave, in concentration, equilibrium di-
rect benefit function. (Convex, in concentration, equilib-
rium direct benefit function indicates convex, in concen-
tration, equilibrium expected net alphas.) 
Proof of Proposition RA3 . See the online Main Appendix. 
The intuition behind Proposition RA3(1) is as follows.
A change of H affects expected net alpha, E( αi | D ) | { e ∗, f ∗, δ∗} ,
in two stages. In the first stage, if a higher H induces a
larger (smaller) impact on gross alphas than on costs, it in-
creases (decreases) managers’ ability to produce expected
net alphas, thereby increasing (decreasing) the level of ex-
pected net alphas produced. In the second stage, investors
react to the increase (decrease) in fund expected net al-
phas by increasing (decreasing) investment levels in funds,
consequently decreasing (increasing) expected net alphas,
due to decreasing returns to scale. The risk-return trade-
off of risk-averse investors makes their reaction to changeslibrium direct benefit function is concave (convex), in concentration. 
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in fund expected net alphas less intense. That is, they 
subdue their additional investments to funds when infer- 
ring higher fund expected net alphas due to risk increase, 
and they limit their reduction in investments to funds 
when observing lower fund expected net alphas due to risk 
decrease. 
The first stage and second stage, the latter as affected 
by risk attitudes, result in a change of AFMI’s optimal ef- 
fort level. AFMI’s new optimal effort level, in turn, af- 
fects both the level of alpha production and the effort 
costs producing it. The overall outcome depends on the 
relative sensitivity, to concentration, of the alpha produc- 
tion function, on the one hand, and of the effort cost 
function, on the other. We formally show that whether 
a higher H increases the equilibrium expected net al- 
pha, E( αi | D ) | { e ∗, f ∗, δ∗} , depends on whether it has a larger 
impact on gross alphas than on the costs producing it 
[i.e., the sign of d E( αi | D ) /d H | { e ∗, f ∗, δ∗} depends on the sign 
of 
dB ( e ∗
i 
;H ) 
dH 
= A H ( e ∗i ; H ) − c 2 H ( e ∗i ; H ) , as shown in Lemma 
RA1(5)]. 29 Thus, a higher H induces a larger expected net 
alpha if and only if it induces higher equilibrium direct 
benefits, B ( e ∗
i 
; H ) . This explains the expected net alpha part 
of Proposition RA3 (1). 
If a higher H induces a larger (smaller) impact on gross 
alphas than on costs, then it attracts more (less) invest- 
ments to the AFMI [if investors have additional wealth to 
allocate to funds (i.e., S / W < 1)]. This explains the size part 
of Proposition RA3 (1). 
Examining the second-order effects of concentration on 
size, we first note that changes in H that induce a larger 
S / W result in a larger allocation to AFMI funds and, in 
turn, in a higher investors’ overall portfolio risk. Mean- 
variance risk-averse investors facing risk-return tradeoffs 
respond to an increase in marginal portfolio risks, holding 
other parameters constant, by optimally lowering invest- 
ment in funds. Thus, how changes in H affect changes in 
equilibrium S / W depend on how changes in H affect this 
risk-return tradeoff. The implications for the second-order 
derivative d 2 ( S / W )/ dH 2 are in the proof of Proposition RA3 , 
which expresses this tradeoff analytically by identifying 
d 2 ( S / W )/ dH 2 as a sum of two addends. The first addend is
negative (positive) if the direct benefits function is concave 
(convex) in H , and the second one is always negative. This 
shows that a concave B ( e ∗
i 
; H ) in H implies an S / W concave 
in H and that a convex S / W in H implies a convex B ( e ∗
i 
; H )
in H . This explains Proposition RA3 (2). 
Examining the second-order effects of concentra- 
tion on expected net alphas, we show that, as H 
changes, the change of marginal E( αi | D ) | { e ∗, f ∗, δ∗} (i.e., 
d 2 E( αi | D ) /d H 2 | { e ∗, f ∗, δ∗} ) is positively proportional to the 
change of marginal B ( e ∗
i 
; H ) , i.e., d 2 B ( e ∗
i 
; H ) /d H 2 , plus an 
adjustment term that captures the effects of risk. This ad- 
justment term ensures that, holding all other parameters 
constant, if investors’ marginal portfolios risks of invest- 
ing in funds are higher, investors optimally invest less 
in funds. In doing so, they exert a smaller negative im- 
pact on expected net alphas. A higher H thus induces a 29 This total derivative of AFMI direct benefits with respect to H is the 
same as its partial derivative with respect to H . 
Please cite this article as: D. Feldman, K. Saxena and J. Xu, Is the
Journal of Financial Economics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2higher marginal E( αi | D ) | { e ∗, f ∗, δ∗} . When d 2 B ( e ∗i ; H ) /d H 2 is 
positive, d 2 E( αi | D ) /d H 2 | { e ∗, f ∗, δ∗} must be positive, whereas 
if d 2 E( αi | D ) /d H 2 | { e ∗, f ∗, δ∗} is negative, d 2 B ( e ∗i ; H ) /d H 2 must 
be negative. This explains Proposition RA3 (3). 
When investors have no additional wealth to allocate 
to funds, i.e., S/W = 1 , they exert no impact on marginal 
E( αi | D ) | { e ∗, f ∗, δ∗} , making the marginal equilibrium optimal 
expected net alphas depend only on the effect of H on 
managers’ ability to produce net alphas. 
2.3. Relation to Berk and Green (2004) and Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2012) 
Our model follows the pivotal works of BG and PS 
in several respects. Central features of our model include 
industry-level decreasing returns to scale and risk-averse 
investors, as in PS, as well as fund-level decreasing returns 
to scale, as in BG. We highlight the main differences be- 
tween our model and those of PS and BG. We discuss the 
special cases in which their model and ours overlap and 
we obtain results similar to theirs. 
2.3.1. Relation to Pastor and Stambaugh (2012) 
While PS model and compare expected net alpha and 
AFMI size, within two extreme regimes, a fully competi- 
tive equilibrium ( M → ∞ ) and a monopolistic equilibrium 
( M = 1 ), we model and study tradeoffs across a continuum 
of AFMI concentration levels for any given M , where M > 1. 
This concentration–alpha relation in our model is a mech- 
anism distinct from and additional to the AFMI size–alpha 
relation in PS. In our model, the concentration–alpha re- 
lation also exists when controlling for the size of the in- 
dustry (or the growth of the industry). Analytically, this is 
the case because concentration affects the optimal level of 
effort by affecting effort productivity [the third addend of 
the right side of Eq. (7) ] and the cost of effort [Eq. (18)] . 
In our model, heterogeneous fund-level decreasing re- 
turns to scale are required for making the AFMI concen- 
tration nontrivial by allowing funds to have heterogeneous 
sizes. (PS’s model identifies the AFMI equilibrium elegantly, 
without the need to specify fund-level heterogeneity in 
fund size.) Fund-level decreasing returns does not directly 
influence alpha in our model. It influences alpha only via 
effort, concentration, and size. If we do not model effort, 
our model with only fund-level decreasing returns will not 
generate the concentration–alpha relation. The gist of the 
argument is that introducing fund heterogeneity would af- 
fect AFMI size and expected net alphas only if, in ag- 
gregate, it affects the industry’s alpha production. Such 
aggregate effects are fully captured within the industry 
returns to scale structure (as in PS). The only difference 
is that in PS the industry returns to scale parameter is 
ˆ b , while in our model the aggregate industry returns to 
scale parameter is ˆ b + ( ∑ M i =1 c 1 , i −1 ) −1 W (see the Corollary 
to Proposition RA2 ). Introducing fund-level heterogeneity 
that does not have industry aggregate effect would not af- 
fect the AFMI size and expected net alphas. In other words, 
changes in AFMI concentration due to introducing fund- 
level heterogeneity, without all effort effects, either are 
captured by industry returns to scale effects or have no 
effect.  active fund management industry concentrated enough? 
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30 For risk-neutral investors, Proposition RA1(2) follows directly from Eq. 
(A49). Our model becomes similar to the one in PS in our
special case in which neither AFMI concentration nor
managers’ effort affect s managers’ search productivity
for mispriced assets. Analytically, effort does not affect
alpha production in our model if the third addend of the
right side of Eq. (7) does not exist and if we abandon
our cost function, Eq. (18) , in favor of defining fund fees
to be the net of fund management costs. Even when, in
our model, the search productivity for mispriced assets
depends on effort, a special case of parameter values leads
to a solution in which optimal allocated effort is zero. We
report the conditions for this special case in Proposition
PS and its corollary. Intuitively, this is the case if, for all
concentration levels, costs of efforts to improve alpha
production exceed the benefits of the resulting increase
in alphas. That is, market conditions are insufficiently
conducive to launching a costly search for favorable in-
vestment opportunities. Thus, optimally, no extra effort is
exerted, and our model results resemble those in PS. 
Proposition PS . For manager i, i = 1 , 2 , . . . , M if initial ef-
fort inputs generate non-positive AFMI direct benefits of ef-
fort [ i.e., equilibrium optimal proportional effort levels e ∗
i 
are
zero [ i.e. , e ∗
i 
= 0 , ∀ i ], and the optimal proportional fee f ∗
i 
equals the average cost of operating funds c 0 + c 1 , i s i ( i.e. ,
f ∗
i 
= c 0 , i + c 1 , i s i , ∀ i ]. 
Corollary to Proposition PS . Under the conditions in
Proposition PS , the equilibrium here resembles the one in PS.
That is, effort is not exerted, and managers optimally choose
not to charge fees above break-even costs. Eq. (4) becomes 
αi = a − b 
S 
W 
− f i , (29)
identical to Eq. (8) in PS. 
Proof of Proposition PS . See the online Main Appendix. 
This corollary says that AFMI concentration will not in-
fluence the AFMI size or AFMI expected net alpha if, for all
concentration levels, the optimal effort of fund managers is
zero, given their trade-off between productivity and costs.
The industry-level decreasing returns to scale mechanism
of PS will still function and generate a negative relation be-
tween AFMI size and AFMI expected net alpha. While the
latter effect represents how managers’ ability to outper-
form passive benchmarks declines with AFMI size, the for-
mer effect represents how a manager’s incentives to exert
individual effort to outperform passive benchmarks are in-
fluenced by AFMI’s concentration (for the same AFMI size
and number of managers). 
2.3.2. Relation to Berk and Green (2004) 
As in PS, our baseline model assumes risk-averse in-
vestors. This assumption produces positive AFMI expected
net alpha. When investors are risk-averse, expected net al-
phas are positive because investors require compensation
to bear the risk of investing in active funds. BG do not
solve the investor’ optimization problem and fix expected
net alpha to be zero by invoking the assumption that non-
benchmark risk can be completely diversified away across
many funds (see also the discussion in PS, p. 775). This
feature of the BG equilibrium is compatible with the case,Please cite this article as: D. Feldman, K. Saxena and J. Xu, Is the
Journal of Financial Economics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2in our model, in which infinitely many small risk-neutral
investors compete, and the size of the fund endogenously
adjusts to make the gross alpha equal to the fee so that ex-
pected net alpha is always zero. In the case of risk-neutral
investors, our model, and the corresponding model in PS,
produces zero AFMI expected net alpha. This is formally
stated in Proposition RN1 . 
In the case of risk-neutral investors, the AFMI Nash
equilibrium ( Proposition RA0 ) and the equilibrium char-
acterizations of Proposition RA1 and Lemma RA1 hold as
well. As the proofs are highly similar, for brevity, we omit
them here. 30 We describe the different equilibrium charac-
teristics for which investors are risk-neutral. 
Proposition RN1 . For N → ∞ risk-neutral investors, equilib-
rium optimal allocations induce AFMI size to be 
δ∗T j ιM = S/W = min 
{ 
X 
(
e ∗
i 
, H 
)
ˆ b + 
(∑ M 
i =1 c 
−1 
1 ,i 
)−1 
W 
, 1 
} 
, ∀ j, (30)
and equilibrium expected net alphas to be 
E ( αi | D ) | { e ∗, f ∗, δ∗} = 0 , where S/W < 1 , (31)
and 
E ( αi | D ) | { e ∗, f ∗, δ∗} = X 
(
e ∗i , H 
)
−
⎡ ⎣ ̂ b + ( M ∑ 
i =1 
c −1 
1 ,i 
) −1 
W 
⎤ ⎦ ≥ 0 ,
where S/W = 1 . (32)
Proof of Proposition RN1 . See the online Main Appendix. 
Risk-neutral investors keep investing in the AFMI as
long as they expect to earn positive net alphas. Eventu-
ally, either they drive alphas to zero and have E( αi | D ) = 0
and S / W ≤ 1 or they run out of funds and have E( αi | D ) ≥ 0
and S/W = 1 . If some of the wealth is passively man-
aged ( S / W < 1), then, irrespective of AFMI concentration
or AFMI size, equilibrium expected net alpha will be zero
[ E( αi | D ) = 0 ] . This result parallels the results of BG and
the risk-neutral case (with perfect competition) of PS. Our
additional result is that, even in the risk-neutral case, the
AFMI size will depend on AFMI concentration through its
effect on X( e ∗
i 
, H ) . The intuition is that, even though the
AFMI expected net alphas are driven to zero, higher AFMI
concentration incentivizes managers to invest more ef-
fort for finding mispriced assets. (Expected net alphas are
driven to zero along a path of search for investment oppor-
tunities when managers exert more effort.) This increase in
optimal effort increases the AFMI size at which investors
are indifferent between investing an additional dollar with
the AFMI and the passive benchmark. 
Another difference between BG and our model is the
source of heterogenous manager ability. In BG, the source
of heterogenous manager ability is the expected excess re-
turn (over the passive benchmark) earned on the first dol-
lar actively managed by a fund. In our model, this quan-
tity is the same across funds. The source of heterogenous
manager ability in our model is the fund-level decreasing active fund management industry concentrated enough? 
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31 In an M -fund AFMI, for example, the HHI could have values between 
the highest concentration, 1, where one of the funds captures practi- 
cally all the market share, and the lowest concentration, 1/ M , where 
market shares are evenly divided. That is, in an M -funds’ market, HHI ∈ 
[ 1 
M 
, 1) . 〈 / END 〉 In our model, predictions 1 and 2 follow if and only if direct 
benefits of effort increase with concentration. Therefore, empirical sup- 
port for these predictions also provides additional evidence in support of 
our assumption that direct benefits of effort increase with concentration. 
Prediction 3 relies on an alternative assumption described in Footnote 6. returns to scale parameter c 1, i , which measures the rate 
at which the manager’s costs in generating gross alpha in- 
crease with size. A more skilled manager in our model is 
one who has lower total variable costs of active manage- 
ment for the same AUM and gross alpha. Therefore, in our 
equilibrium, managers with the lower fund-level decreas- 
ing returns to scale parameter ( c 1, i ) have more AUM. While 
the fund-level decreasing returns to scale parameter in BG 
influences the fund’s AUM in the same way [large parame- 
ter corresponds to a smaller fund, see their Eq. (27) ], they 
assume this parameter to be the same across funds. 
Our choice of modeling heterogeneity in c 1, i (as a 
source of heterogenous manager ability) enables us to 
obtain heterogeneity in equilibrium fund sizes as well 
as a positive equilibrium fee charged by managers (see 
Lemma RA1 ). In the competitive equilibrium of PS, the fee 
is zero. If the fee (net of costs) were, instead, equal to some 
positive value in PS, then any fund manager would set 
an infinitesimally lower fee to attract all investment from 
other funds. We model costs explicitly, and in equilibrium 
fees compensate managers for their costs [fund managers 
charge (positive) break-even fees], which include a compo- 
nent related to size and a component related to effort (see 
Lemma RA1 ). 
Fund managers in the BG model are indifferent to the 
fee they charge as long as two conditions are met (see 
their Section II.A ): (1) this fee is less than the hypotheti- 
cal fee they could charge to maximize their compensation, 
and (2) they can expand their fund by investing in the pas- 
sive benchmark (i.e., closet indexing). They show that, un- 
der their assumptions, managers are indifferent between 
large AUM with a small fee and small AUM with a large 
fee as long as their profits stay the same. In BG’s frame- 
work, fund managers can choose their AUM independently 
of competing fund managers’ skills. This assumption allows 
fund size to be arbitrary and unrelated to skill. 
We model competition between managers with differ- 
ent returns to scale parameters. In our equilibrium, this 
competition for finite AUM results in zero profits and 
break-even fees charged by managers, as well as in relative 
fund sizes that correspond to the relative rates at which 
fund-level returns to scale decrease (our measure of abil- 
ity). In other words, the AFMI fund size distribution re- 
flects the distribution of ability. This implies a tight link 
between skill of an AFMI fund manager ( c 1 , i 
−1 ), the man- 
ager’s fund size, the manager fund’s market share, and the 
manager fund’s net alpha. In Proposition RA4 , we describe 
how a decrease in skill (increase in the cost, c 1, i ) of one 
fund manager leads to a decrease in the manager’s fund 
size and an increase in the fund sizes of competing man- 
agers. Such a decrease in an AFMI manager skill will also 
have an industry-wide effect of a decreasing the AFMI net 
alpha. Such effects of changes in skill of one fund manager 
on the fund sizes and alphas of other fund managers are 
absent in the BG equilibrium. 
Proposition RA4 . Relation between skill, market share and net 
alpha . 
When S / W ≤ 1, a decrease (increase) in manager i’s skill, 
c 1 , i 
−1 , while manager j’s skill, c 1 , j −1 , ∀ j 
 = i is unchanged, in- 
duces Please cite this article as: D. Feldman, K. Saxena and J. Xu, Is the
Journal of Financial Economics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.21 A decrease (increase) in s i / S and an increase (decrease) in 
s j / S , ∀ j 
 = i and 
2 A decrease (increase) in E( αi | D ) | { e ∗, f ∗, δ∗} and a decrease 
(increase) in E( α j | D ) | { e ∗, f ∗, δ∗} , ∀ j 
 = i . 
Proof of Proposition RA4 . See the online Main Appendix. 
According to Proposition RA4 , a decrease in manager i ’s 
skill leads to a decrease in i ’s market share, s i / S . Some of
the assets that fund i loses are invested in all other funds, 
thereby increasing the market share of all other funds. 
A higher skill (lower c 1, i ) affects E( αi | D ) | { e ∗, f ∗, δ∗} in two 
stages. In the first stage, it decreases manager i ’s average 
cost and, thus, induces higher fund expected net alphas. As 
manager i offers a higher fund expected net alpha, invest- 
ments shift into fund i from other funds, making all those 
fund expected net alphas higher due to decreasing returns 
to scale at fund level. At the second stage, an increase 
in fund expected net alphas attracts investments into the 
AFMI, which drives down fund expected net alphas due to 
decreasing returns to scale at industry level. When N → ∞ 
and S / W < 1, investors’ portfolio risks increase (decrease) 
when they invest more (less) in the AFMI. Thus, they sub- 
due AFMI investments increases when observing an in- 
crease in fund expected net alphas, and they limit invest- 
ment reductions when observing a decrease in fund ex- 
pected net alphas. Investors’ risk aversion mitigates the 
countered effect at the second stage and makes the first 
stage’s effect dominant. 
When S/W = 1 , investors have no additional wealth to 
allocate to funds, so their investments have no impact on 
marginal equilibrium optimal expected net alphas, causing 
the first stage’s effect to dominate. 
In summary, this proposition describes novel results, 
compared with BG, arising from modeling competition be- 
tween managers with different fund-level returns to scale 
parameters. 
2.4. Endogeneity in measures of AFMI concentration 
Our model allows for an endogenous measure of AFMI 
concentration. Modeling an endogenous measure of con- 
centration facilitates the use of available and prevalent 
empirical measures. If we define concentration to be the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index ( HHI ), which is the sum of 
market shares squared, then, HHI is endogenous to our 
model. 31 Using funds’ equilibrium market share, as iden- 
tified in Lemma RA1 , we can write the equilibrium AFMI 
concentration HHI ∗ as 
H H I ∗ = 
M ∑ 
i =1 
(
s i 
S 
)2 
= 
M ∑ 
i =1 
( 
c 1 , i 
M ∑ 
j=1 
(
c 1 , j 
−1 )) −2 . (33)  active fund management industry concentrated enough? 
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33 More generally, these two measures have different possible 
concentration-level intervals. Independent of the number (greater than 
one) of industry firms, under the NHHI all concentration distributions are 
on the interval [0, 1). Under the HHI , an M -firm industry ( M > 1) has a 
concentration distribution on the interval [ 1 
M 
, 1) . At concentration levels 
near one, one of the funds captures practically all the market share, HHI ∗ is determined by c 1, i s. Depending on the size of
c 1, i relative to that c 1, j , ∀ j 
 = i , an increase in c 1, i , holding
c 1, j , ∀ j 
 = i constant, increases or decreases HHI ∗. For fur-
ther analysis and discussion of the endogenous measure of
AFMI concentration, see the online Main Appendix. 
In general, we expect the theoretical concentration level
in our framework to be influenced by industry characteris-
tics such as regulations, transaction costs, tax rates, bar-
riers to entry, and funds’ idiosyncratic outcomes, in ad-
dition to funds’ cost sensitivity to size (i.e., c 1, i s). For ex-
ample, Hong (2018) finds that a policy reform in Hong
Kong (the 2012 Employee Choice Arrangement) substan-
tially increased competition in the fund management in-
dustry by dramatically expanding the choices for pension
plan participants from an average of 11 funds to more than
four hundred funds. In these cases, the concentration level
can change even when all the cost sensitivities (or fund
manager skill) are constant. We do not model the various
determinants of concentration levels and simply assume
them to be exogenous. As long as real-world concentra-
tion is not exactly determined by the c 1, i s (or any other ex-
ogenous parameter of our model), we are back to the case
that when concentration is exogenous (that is, has an ex-
ogenous component), our predictions remain unaltered re-
garding the relation between changes in exogenous AFMI
concentration level, the equilibrium fund expected net al-
phas, and AFMI size. 
3. Empirical predictions and test method 
In this section, we describe key empirical predictions
that our theoretical model generates, followed by our data
and methodology to test these predictions. 
3.1. Empirical predictions 
Underlying our empirical predictions is the theoretical
scenario in which an increase in the AFMI concentration
has a larger effect on the availability of mispriced invest-
ment opportunities than on any associated costs of exploit-
ing these opportunities (higher concentration induces a
larger marginal effort impact on gross alpha than on costs).
For instance, costs associated with an increase in effort can
be staff’s increase in compensation (endogenously deter-
mined). We assume that these costs are less than the value
added to the firm due to the increase in effort. We claim
this is a reasonable assumption. [See, for example, Ibert
et al. (2017) , who find concavity of managerial compensa-
tion in firm revenue and weak sensitivity of pay to perfor-
mance.] This assumption means that the direct benefits of
effort [as defined in Eq. (21) ] increase with concentration.
Based on this scenario, we predict that a higher concentra-
tion level is associated with larger AFMI size [ Proposition
RA3 (1)], higher AFMI net alpha [ Proposition RA3 (1)], and
higher AFMI effort [Lemma RA1(3)]. 32 32 We also omit some rare cases in which more than five years’ return 
observations are missing in a ten-year window. This improves the esti- 
mation of our style-matching model with a five-year rolling estimation 
window. 
Please cite this article as: D. Feldman, K. Saxena and J. Xu, Is the
Journal of Financial Economics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2Effort is largely unobservable. Even the salaries of man-
agers are difficult to observe. Therefore, it is difficult to
test the third prediction directly. Instead, we provide in-
direct suggestive evidence in favor of our model. We use
aggregate AFMI active share and tracking error as prox-
ies for effort. 33 These proxies are likely to be correlated
with effort because any attempt to outperform the bench-
mark must involve taking positions that are different from
the benchmark ( Cremers and Petajisto, 2009 ). One rea-
son active share can be uncorrelated with effort is that
fund managers could jam the signal in active share by
taking uninformed bets to increase their perceived active
share, generating a false sense of truly active management
( Brown and Davies, 2017 ). Such signal jamming behavior is
more likely to be an issue if a measure of active share is
tied with fund manager incentives, which is not likely in
our sample period (our sample for active share tests ends
in 2009, the same year as the publication of Cremers and
Petajisto, 2009 . Also, information asymmetry and its as-
sociated signal jamming in Brown and Davies (2017) per-
tains to fund-level active share. Our prediction is for aggre-
gate AFMI-level effort (not relative effort of funds), where
information asymmetry and signal jamming” are less
important. 
Our model also has a second-order prediction that we
test, that is, the AFMI net alphas and AFMI size are both ei-
ther concave or convex in AFMI concentration [ Proposition
RA3 (2) and Proposition RA3 (3)]. 
3.2. Data 
We obtain our active fund data from Morningstar Di-
rect. Our sample contains 1374 actively managed US (do-
mestic) equity-only mutual funds from January 1979 to
December 2014. We include both open-ended and closed-
ended funds. We exclude index funds, enhanced index
funds, funds of funds, international funds, industry sector
funds, real estate funds, and other non-equity funds. While
we analyze fund-level data, the Morningstar data are of-
ten at the fund share class level. We use the fund identi-
fication provided by Morningstar to aggregate fund share
class-level information to fund-level information (because
many mutual funds offer multiple share classes, which rep-
resent claims on the same underlying assets but have dif-
ferent fee structures; see also PST, footnote 11). Because we
use a five-year rolling window to estimate fund net alphas,
we require each of our active equity mutual funds to have
at least ten years of monthly return observations. 34 The
online Empirical Appendix details the keywords and filtersand at the lowest concentration, 1/ M , market shares are evenly divided. 
A three-firm industry would induce a concentration-level distribution 
on [0.33, 1), and a four-firm industry would induce a concentration 
distribution on [0.25, 1). 
34 As in PST, we do not use the Fama–French factors ( Fama and French, 
1993 ) as our benchmark. PST (p. 31) note, “The Fama–French factors are 
popular in mutual fund studies because their returns are freely avail- 
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uity mutual funds. 
We also obtain data on index funds from Morn- 
ingstar. These index funds, which we use to benchmark 
the performance of active mutual funds, include those 
from the Morningstar Institutional Categories of Small Core 
(Vanguard Small Cap Index), Large Core (EQ/Common Stock 
Index Portfolio), and Standard & Poor’s 500 Tracking (Van- 
guard 500 Index). We require index funds to have no miss- 
ing observations in our sample period. All the fund returns 
are net of administrative and management fees and other 
costs taken out of fund assets. 
We obtain quarterly data on fund-level active share 
and tracking error from the Antti Petajisto website ( www. 
petajisto.net/data.html ). Petajisto (2013) contains a descrip- 
tion of how these data are constructed. 
3.3. Variable definitions 
We now define how we measure key variables in our 
analysis. 
AFMI Size represents the active equity mutual fund 
AFMI size relative to total stock market capitalization. Our 
measure of AFMI size ( SoW t , size over wealth) is the sum 
of the net AUM of US active equity funds in our sample, 
divided by stock market capitalization, which is defined as 
the sum of all individual stocks’ market capitalization in 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) (share code 
of 10 or 11) in the same month. 
AFMI Active Share is the quarterly average active share 
of active funds (in Petajisto’s database). We exclude in- 
dex funds and enhanced index funds in the database when 
identifying active funds. 
AFMI Tracking Error is the AFMI tracking error as the av- 
erage tracking error of active funds (excluding index funds 
and enhanced index funds) in that quarter. 
MS i , t is the market share of fund i at time t , measured 
by the fund’s AUM at time t over the total AFMI’s AUM 
at time t. We use fund net asset value data at a monthly 
frequency to calculate MS i , t . 
AFMI Concentration , following the literature, is mea- 
sured using three indices (see, for example, Berger and 
Hannan, 1989; Geroski, 1990; Berger, 1995; Goldberg and 
Rai, 1996; Nickell, 1996; Berger et al., 1999; Cremers et al., 
2008; Giroud and Mueller, 2011 ). All three indices are con- 
structed using two variables: MS i , t and m t , where m t is the 
number of funds at time t . We calculate m t at a monthly 
frequency. 
Our three measures of AFMI concentration are HHI , the 
normalized HHI ( NHHI ), and the sum of the first five largest 
funds’ market shares (5 FI ). able. Yet the Fama–French factors are not obvious choices because they 
are long-short portfolios whose returns cannot be costlessly achieved by 
mutual fund managers or investors.” In addition, Cremers, Petajisto, and 
Zitzewitz (2012) and Grinblatt and Saxena (2017) argue that the Fama–
French model produces biased assessments of alpha. To avoid such prob- 
lems and remain consistent with our model in which investors compare 
active funds with a traded passive benchmark, we use Sharpe style anal- 
ysis and identify an appropriate traded benchmark for each mutual fund 
in our sample. 
Please cite this article as: D. Feldman, K. Saxena and J. Xu, Is the
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H H I t = 
m t ∑ 
i 
MS 2 i, t . (34) 
The HHI is a commonly used measure of concentration 
(see, for example, Cremers et al., 2008 and Giroud and 
Mueller, 2011 ) and is well grounded in theory (see Tirole, 
1988 , pp. 221–223). As the value of the HHI is related to 
the number of funds ( m t ), for a robustness check, we also 
use two measures not related to the number of funds to 
measure AFMI concentration: the NHHI used by Cremers 
et al. (2008) and the 5 FI , another common measure of 
AFMI concentration. 
For the NHHI , 
NH H I t = 
H H I t − 1 m t 
1 − 1 
m t 
. (35) 
The NHHI induces similarity in possible concentration-level 
distributions. For example, it is zero for an industry in 
which all firms have equal market shares, regardless of 
whether it has three or four firms. In contrast, the HHI is 
0.33 for the three-firm industry with equal market shares 
and 0.25 for the four-firm industry. 35 
For the five-fund index, 
5 F I t = 
5 ∑ 
i =1 
M S i, t . (36) 
Our model provides a relation between these measures 
of AFMI concentration and fund-level decreasing returns to 
scale parameters. Using the HHI as the measure of AFMI 
concentration HHI ∗ and fund equilibrium market shares, 
as identified in Lemma RA1 , we can write an expression 
for equilibrium AFMI concentration HHI ∗ [Eq. (33)] . (Sim- 
ilar relations can be obtained for NHHI and five-fund in- 
dex.) This expression shows a relation between HHI ∗ and 
the c 1, i ’s. The question of which of the two quantities is 
exogenous, or whether both are determined together in 
equilibrium, is a complex one that is beyond the scope of 
this paper (see Section 2.4 for a discussion of this issue). 
We simply use these empirical measures as proxies for the 
true level of AFMI concentration (or competition) and do 
not enforce restrictions between cost parameters and HHI . 
Fund net alpha. Our measure of net alpha ( αi, t ) is the 
difference between a fund’s net return and the net re- 
turn on the benchmark we assign to the fund. The bench- 
mark against which we judge a fund’s net alpha is a set of 
(traded) index funds selected using style analysis ( Sharpe, 
1992 ). 36 These index funds are intended to represent the 
next-best investment opportunity available to investors as 35 To be a valid instrument of M S i, t−1 , M S i, t−1 must satisfy the relevance 
and exclusion conditions. The relevance condition is likely to hold because 
both M S i, t−1 and M S i, t−1 are derived from M S i, t−1 and are, thus, likely to 
be closely related. The exclusion condition is also likely to hold because 
the backward-looking information in M S i, t−1 is unlikely to be helpful in 
predicting the forward-looking net alpha information in ε i, t , where ε i, t is 
the residual in the RD method. We correct the second-stage standard er- 
ror estimates of β1 by incorporating the estimation errors from the first- 
stage regression. 
36 To be a valid instrument of M S i, t−1 , M S i, t−1 must satisfy the relevance 
and exclusion conditions. The relevance condition is likely to hold because 
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a tradable passive index ( Berk and van Binsbergen, 2015 ).
In our model, we assume that a single passive benchmark
exists and is common knowledge to investors and man-
agers. In the theoretical analysis, we make this assumption
for parsimony. Relaxing it does not alter the key insights
from our model. In Section 4 , we allow for multiple bench-
marks and match each active equity mutual fund to a set
of tradable index funds that reasonably replicate passive
alternatives available to an average mutual fund investor.
We estimate the equation 
R i, t = αi, t + b 1 i, t F 1 t + b 2 i, t F 2 t + · · · + b n i, t F n t , (37)
where the indices i and t represent the fund and time in-
dices, and n indicates the number of tradable index funds
in the market. R i , t is the return net of management fee of
a fund, and F 1 t through F 
n 
t are the returns net of manage-
ment fees of tradable index funds in different asset classes.
We also allow for a risk-free fund by including the CRSP
Fama–French risk-free rate as a potential benchmark. We
treat the index funds F 1 t through F 
n 
t as a basis fund set that
can be used to replicate the returns on any passive bench-
marks used by mutual fund investors. 
We perform this analysis on a rolling basis, using re-
turns from months (t − 60) to (t − 1) , in order to avoid a
look-ahead bias. For each active fund in our sample, we
identify coefficients, b 1 
i, t 
to b n 
i, t 
, that minimize the vari-
ance of the residuals, which are also the tracking errors
between the active fund return and a corresponding pas-
sive benchmark portfolio return ( Sharpe, 1992 ). These co-
efficients are constrained to be between zero and one (we
do not allow short selling), and their sum is constrained to
be one. These coefficients identify the portfolio weights, on
our basis index fund set, that provide the estimated pas-
sive benchmark portfolio for a fund. This portfolio gives
the minimum tracking error. Our empirical design of iden-
tifying passive benchmarks using matching tradable index
funds fits our theoretical structure, which assumes the ap-
propriate passive benchmarks for each fund. 
To calculate a fund’s net alphas in month t , we subtract
the returns on the identified set of passive portfolios (the
style benchmark) for month t from the active equity fund’s
returns in month t [see Eq. (37) ] . This provides us with
fund net alphas in each month for each fund. 
To evaluate the robustness of our results, we use an al-
ternative method to measure fund net alphas. This method
addresses the possibility that traded index funds do not
capture unobserved risk factors that drive excess returns.
Errors in our set of passive benchmarks or our matching
strategy can result in net alphas that measure exposure to
unobserved common risk factors instead of fund manager
performance. Using the method developed by Connor and
Korajczyk (1988) , we estimate unobserved common factors
in our estimated fund net alphas using the principal com-
ponents (PC) of our estimated fund net alphas series. Weboth M S i, t−1 and M S i, t−1 are derived from M S i, t−1 and are, thus, likely to 
be closely related. The exclusion condition is also likely to hold because 
the backward-looking information in M S i, t−1 is unlikely to be helpful in 
predicting the forward-looking net alpha information in ε i, t , where ε i, t is 
the residual in the RD method. We correct the second-stage standard er- 
ror estimates of β1 by incorporating the estimation errors from the first- 
stage regression. 
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common factors in fund net alphas. We regress (without
a constant term) each fund’s net alphas on the first two
PC factors. We refer to the residuals of these regressions
as PC-adjusted fund net alphas and use them as the de-
pendent variable in our robustness analysis. See the on-
line Empirical Appendix for details on how we calculate
PC-adjusted fund net alphas. 
We control for fund-level decreasing returns to scale by
adding lagged fund size as a control. Following PST, we
measure Fund size as the fund’s AUM at the end of the pre-
vious month, inflated to December 2014 dollars by using
the ratio of the total stock market capitalization in Decem-
ber 2014 to its value at the end of the previous month.
They argue that this is a reasonable way to measure the
limitations on a fund due to its size. It captures the size
of the fund relative to the universe of stocks that the fund
can buy. 
3.4. Methodology 
We analyze the impact of AFMI concentration on AFMI
size, AFMI active share, and tracking error (predictions 1
and 3) at industry level. We analyze the impact of AFMI
concentration on AFMI alpha (prediction 2) using fund-
level data to control for potential effects of market share
(fund size divided by total AFMI size) on performance
and an associated omitted-variable and finite sample bias
(see PST). We study second-order predictions using both
industry-level data and fund-level data as prediction 4 re-
quires that AFMI net alphas (measured using fund-level
data) and AFMI size (measured using industry-level data)
are both either concave or convex in AFMI concentration. 
3.4.1. Industry-level analysis 
Using monthly data, in analyzing the relation between
AFMI size and AFMI concentration, we use vector autore-
gression (VAR). The main equation in the VAR system is 
So W t = b 0 + b 1 So W t−1 + b 2 H H I t−1 + b 3 H H I 2 t−1 + e t , (38)
Where SoW t is AFMI size and e t represents regression
residuals. In the VAR system, we also have equations in
which HHI t depends on H H I t−1 and So W t−1 and H H I 2 t de-
pends on H H I 2 
t−1 . 
In addition, we use two effort proxies, active share ( AS t )
and tracking error ( TE t ), which are likely to represent dif-
ferent dimensions of effort. According to Cremers and Peta-
jisto (2009) , the active share measure emphasizes stock
selection, and tracking error volatility emphasizes bets on
systematic risk factors. Therefore, we include the effects of
both these dimensions in testing prediction 3, using VAR:
A S t = b 01 + b 11 A S t−1 + b 11 T E t−1 + b 31 H H I t−1 + e 1 t (39)
T E t = b 02 + b 12 A S t−1 + b 12 T E t−1 + b 32 H H I t−1 + e 2 t , (40)
where e 1 t and e 2 t represent regression residuals. In the
VAR system, we also have the equation in which HHI t de-
pends on H H I t−1 , A S t−1 , and T E t−1 .  active fund management industry concentrated enough? 
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We follow PST’s methodology to control for omitted- 
variable and finite-sample bias in our alpha analysis. The 
omitted-variable problem arises from the cross-sectional 
variation in performance that is due to differences in skill 
across funds. PST note that fund fixed effects can con- 
trol for this heterogeneity as long as fund skill is time- 
invariant. However, adding fund fixed effects introduces 
finite-sample bias due to the positive contemporaneous 
correlation between changes in fund size and unexpected 
fund returns. To avoid these biases, we use the PST recur- 
sive demeaning (RD) estimator. We estimate the effects of 
a fund’s market share ( β1 ), AFMI concentration ( β2 and 
β3 ), and AFMI size ( β4 ) on fund net alphas using the panel 
regression 
αi,t = β1 M S i,t−1 + β2 H t−1 + β3 H 2 t−1 + β4 So W t−1 + ε i,t . 
(41) 
The bar above the variables denotes forward-demeaned 
variables: 
αi,t = αi,t −
1 
T i − t + 1 
T i ∑ 
s = t 
αi,s , (42) 
M S i,t = M S i,t −
1 
T i − t + 1 
T i ∑ 
s = t 
M S i,s , (43) 
So W t = So W t − 1 
T i − t + 1 
T i ∑ 
s = t 
So W s , (44) 
H H I t = H H I t − 1 
T i − t + 1 
T i ∑ 
s = t 
H H I s , (45) 
and 
H H I 2 t = H H I 2 t −
1 
T i − t + 1 
T i ∑ 
s = t 
H H I 2 t , (46) 
where T i is the number of time series observations of fund 
i . We run robustness checks by replacing HHI with NHHI 
and with 5 FI. 
The RD method in Eq. (41) can control for the fund 
fixed effect. We include market share as a control, not only 
because the equilibrium market share provides informa- 
tion on a fund’s cost sensitivity to fund size ( Lemma RA1 ), 
but also because empirical studies show a linear relation 
between changes in market share and fund performance 
( Spiegel and Zhang, 2013 ) and use it as a firm-level mar- 
ket power measure (e.g., Berger et al., 1999 and Nickell, 
1996 ). Endogeneity (reverse causality) could exist between 
AFMI shares and fund net alphas because when fund net 
alphas are higher, corresponding asset values increase and 
funds attract investments, both leading to a higher mar- 
ket share. This endogeneity issue could bias our results. 
Following PST, we address this issue using an instrumen- 
tal variable method. 37 In the first stage, we regress M S i, t−1 37 To be a valid instrument of M S i, t−1 , M S i, t−1 must satisfy the relevance 
and exclusion conditions. The relevance condition is likely to hold because 
both M S i, t−1 and M S i, t−1 are derived from M S i, t−1 and are, thus, likely to 
be closely related. The exclusion condition is also likely to hold because 
the backward-looking information in M S i, t−1 is unlikely to be helpful in 
Please cite this article as: D. Feldman, K. Saxena and J. Xu, Is the
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(recursively backward-demeaned market share) without a 
constant term. In the second stage, we use the fitted value 
from the first stage to run Eq. (41) , where 
M S i,t = M S i,t −
1 
t − 1 
t−1 ∑ 
s =1 
M S i,s . (47) 
There is no reason to believe that individual fund net 
alphas, which are fund-level variables, are endogenous to 
industry-level measures such as AFMI concentration ratios 
(see, for example, footnote 17 of PST). Thus, to test the 
concentration–alpha relation, we do not use a backward- 
demeaned instrument. We just use the recursive forward- 
demeaned AFMI concentration ratios in Eq. (41) . 
4. Empirical results 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics. Monthly fund 
net alphas are positive on average but exhibit a wide 
variation. We also report summary statistics of the fit of 
our passive benchmark-matching method using R -squared, 
which is measured as 
Rsq r i,t = 1 −
V ar ( αi,t ) 
V ar ( R i,t ) 
, (48) 
where Var (.) denotes variance. On average, our style- 
matching model fits well with an average R -squared of 
0.86 and a standard deviation of about 0.12. The summary 
statistics of AFMI size (total AFMI funds’ net assets divided 
by stock market capitalization) and fund sizes in Decem- 
ber 2014 dollars (funds’ net assets divided by stock market 
capitalization in the same month, multiplied by the stock 
market capitalization in December 2014) are similar to the 
sample in PST. 
The number of active equity mutual funds in our sam- 
ple increases over time and the AFMI concentration mea- 
sures, such as the HHI, NHHI , and 5 FI , with fluctuations, 
tend to decrease over time. Fig. 1 shows the HHI value 
from January 1984 to December 2014. Before 1990, the HHI 
value was relatively high, fluctuating from 0.02 to 0.03. Af- 
ter that, it continued decreasing. In the most recent years, 
it has reached 0.006, which is around a quarter of the val- 
ues before 1990. This figure shows that the concentration 
of the US active equity mutual fund market decreased sub- 
stantially. Alternative AFMI concentration measures, such 
as NHHI and 5 FI , show similar trends. 
Because our sample differs from PST, we check for any 
alarming systematic differences by evaluating the returns 
to scale relation in our sample. In unreported results, we 
find results consistent with PST’s: fund net alpha is signif- 
icantly negatively associated with lagged AFMI size and is 
negatively (but insignificantly) associated with lagged fund 
size. The results suggest decreasing returns to scale at in- 
dustry level. predicting the forward-looking net alpha information in ε i, t , where ε i, t is 
the residual in the RD method. We correct the second-stage standard er- 
ror estimates of β1 by incorporating the estimation errors from the first- 
stage regression. 
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Table 1 
Statistical summary. 
Our sample period is from January 1979 to December 2014, and monthly data are used. Panel A reports the summary statistics for fund-level data, and 
Panel B reports those for industry-level data. Fund net return and fund net alpha are in percentages, and both are net of administrative and management 
fees and other costs taken out of fund assets. HHI, NHHI , and 5 FI are Herfindahl–Hirschman index, normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman index, and five-fund 
index, respectively. MS is fund market share, calculated as a fund’s net assets under management (AUM) divided by the sum of all funds’ net AUM in the 
same month. SoW is AFMI size, calculated as the sum of funds’ net AUM divided by the stock market capitalization in the same month. AS is AFMI active 
share, measured as the average active share of active funds (in Antti Petajisto’s database, www.petajisto.net/data.html ) in a quarter. TE is AFMI tracking 
error, calculated as the average tracking error of active funds in a quarter. Style-matching model R-squared, MS, HHI, NHHI , 5 FI, AS , and TE are in decimals. 
Fund size is measured in $100 million and is equal to the fund’s total net AUM, divided by the stock market capitalization in the same month and multiplied 
by the stock market capitalization in December 2014. Number of funds is in units. 
Percentile 
Variable 
Number of 
observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation 1st 25th 50th 75th 99th 
Panel A: Fund-level data 
Fund net return (percent) 321,456 0.8736 5.1508 −14.4922 −1.7976 1.2998 3.8907 13.0053 
Fund net alpha (percent) 246,553 0.0349 1.9499 −5.4465 −0.8570 0.0215 0.9156 5.5982 
Style-matching model R-squared 
(decimal) 
246,557 0.8607 0.1175 0.4223 0.8178 0.8953 0.9408 0.9894 
Fund size (hundreds of millions 
of December 2014 dollars) 
314,083 28.7796 95.3306 0.0399 1.3833 5.5718 20.1835 416.9203 
MS (decimal) 314,083 0.0012 0.0041 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0007 0.0185 
Panel B: Industry-level data 
SoW (decimal) 432 0.0982 0.0591 0.0200 0.0389 0.1035 0.1638 0.1801 
Number of funds 432 850.2 659.5 86.0 249.0 677.5 1468.5 2126.0 
HHI (decimal) 432 0.0191 0.0230 0.0061 0.0101 0.0157 0.0243 0.0382 
NHHI (decimal) 432 0.0157 0.0139 0.0057 0.0094 0.0141 0.0201 0.0269 
5FI (decimal) 432 0.2166 0.0765 0.1240 0.1640 0.1986 0.2650 0.3438 
AS (decimal) 119 0.8349 0.0416 0.7620 0.7980 0.8440 0.8740 0.8940 
TE (decimal) 119 0.0755 0.0260 0.0382 0.0606 0.0707 0.0868 0.1954 
Fig. 1. Herfindahl–Hirschman Index ( HHI ) value January 1984–December 2014. 
This figure shows the monthly HHI values from January 1984 to December 2014. The HHI is calculated as the sum of the funds’ market shares squared, 
where each fund’s market share is calculated as the fund’s net assets under management (AUM) divided by the sum of all the funds’ net AUM. The HHI ’s 
value is in decimals. The gray bars represent the recession periods. 
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Table 2 
Industry-level analysis: active fund management industry (AFMI) size and AFMI concentration. 
This table reports the results of the main equations in various vector autoregression models, in which AFMI size, SoW , is the dependent variable. The 
sample period is from January 1979 to December 2014, and monthly data are used. SoW is the sum of funds’ net assets under management divided by the 
stock market capitalization in the same month. HHI, NHHI , and 5 FI are Herfindahl–Hirschman index, normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman index, and five-fund 
index, respectively, and HHI 2 , NHHI 2 , and 5 FI 2 are their squared terms. Panels A, B, and C report the results of using HHI, NHHI , and 5 FI as the concentration 
measures, respectively. Time trend is set to be one for January 1979 and to increase by one each month. Small sample-adjusted standard errors are used 
and presented in parentheses. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% significant level in a two-tail t -test, respectively. 
SoW SoW SoW SoW 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: HHI results 
Lagged SoW 1.0033 ∗∗∗ 1.0052 ∗∗∗ 0.9952 ∗∗∗ 0.8772 ∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0035) (0.0063) (0.0293) 
Lagged HHI 0.0287 ∗∗∗ 0.0491 ∗ 0.0754 ∗∗ 0.9341 ∗∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0278) (0.0310) (0.1126) 
Lagged HHI 2 −0.1361 ∗ −0.2044 ∗∗ −2.4601 ∗∗∗
(0.0761) (0.0846) (0.3003) 
Time trend 0.0000 ∗
(0.0000) 
Constant −0.0005 ∗∗ −0.0009 −0.0017 ∗ 0.0155 ∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0054) 
Year dummies No No No Yes 
Number of observations 431 431 431 431 
R -squared 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
Panel B: NHHI results 
Lagged SoW 1.0040 ∗∗∗ 1.0097 ∗∗∗ 0.9999 ∗∗∗ 0.8660 ∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0029) (0.0064) (0.0286) 
Lagged NHHI 0.0497 ∗∗∗ 0.1328 ∗∗∗ 0.1425 ∗∗∗ 1.0085 ∗∗∗
(0.0063) (0.0335) (0.0341) (0.1148) 
Lagged NHHI 2 −0.6050 ∗∗∗ −0.6446 ∗∗∗ −4.2975 ∗∗∗
(0.1493) (0.1515) (0.4981) 
Time trend 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
Constant −0.0008 ∗∗∗ −0.0024 ∗∗∗ −0.0025 ∗∗∗ 0.0175 ∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0052) 
Year dummies No No No Yes 
Number of observations 431 431 431 431 
R -squared 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
Panel C: 5FI results 
Lagged SoW 1.0090 ∗∗∗ 1.0052 ∗∗∗ 0.9961 ∗∗∗ 0.8526 ∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0032) (0.0062) (0.0291) 
Lagged 5FI 0.0109 ∗∗∗ 0.0122 ∗∗ 0.0149 ∗∗∗ 0.1353 ∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0052) (0.0055) (0.0208) 
Lagged 5FI 2 −0.0114 ∗∗∗ −0.0132 ∗∗∗ −0.0977 ∗∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0156) 
Time trend 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
Constant −0.0029 ∗∗∗ −0.0022 ∗ −0.0028 ∗∗ 0.0101 
(0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0062) 
Year dummies No No No Yes 
Number of observations 431 431 431 431 
R -squared 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 We begin our empirical analysis by evaluating the rela- 
tion between AFMI size and AFMI concentration. The re- 
sults of the main equations of the VARs are shown in 
Table 2 . The first column of each model specification shows 
how AFMI size is positively associated with HHI . The re- 
sult of interest in this table is that AFMI size is signifi- 
cantly positively associated with lagged HHI (Model Spec- 
ification 1) and is significantly negatively associated with 
the second order of lagged HHI (Model Specification 2). 
If we further include a time trend or year dummies into 
the model, we find consistent results (Model Specifications 
3 and 4). That is, AFMI size is increasing and concave in 
AFMI concentration. In Panels B and C, we analyze the Please cite this article as: D. Feldman, K. Saxena and J. Xu, Is the
Journal of Financial Economics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2sensitivity of our results to alternative measures of AFMI 
concentration: NHHI and 5 FI . We generally find consistent 
results. Thus, we conclude that the data supports predic- 
tion 1. From our model’s perspective, the positive rela- 
tion between AFMI size and AFMI concentration indicates 
that higher AFMI concentration levels, on average, increase 
gross alphas more than they increase effort costs. 
Next, we evaluate the relation between fund net alphas 
and AFMI concentration. The results using the RD method 
are shown in Table 3 . Panel A reports the results using 
fund net alpha as the dependent variable. In the first two 
columns, we find that the coefficient of the first-order term 
of lagged HHI is significantly positive and the coefficient  active fund management industry concentrated enough? 
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Table 3 
Fund-level analysis: fund net alpha and active fund management industry (AFMI) concentration. 
This table reports the results of our recursive demeaning panel regression model. Results are presented using fund net alpha in columns (1)–(5) and 
PC-adjusted fund net alpha (adjusted by the first two principal components of fund net alphas) in columns (6)–(8), as the dependent variables. SoW is AFMI 
size, calculated as the sum of funds’ net assets under management (AUM) divided by the stock market capitalization in the same month. MS is fund market 
share, calculated as a fund’s net AUM divided by the sum of all funds’ net AUM in the same month. HHI, NHHI , and 5 FI are Herfindahl–Hirschman index, 
normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman index, and five-fund index, respectively, and HHI 2 , NHHI 2 , and 5FI 2 are their squared terms. Panels A, B, and C report 
the results of using HHI, NHHI , and 5FI as the concentration measures, respectively. The unit of coefficients is percentage. Standard errors are clustered by 
fund and presented in parentheses. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% significant level in a two-tail t -test, respectively. 
Fund net alpha PC-adjusted fund net alpha 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: HHI results 
Lagged HHI 6.5277 ∗∗∗ 40.0796 ∗∗∗ 39.1271 ∗∗ 35.3591 ∗∗∗ 34.8497 ∗∗ 2.5033 ∗∗∗ 11.8816 ∗∗∗ 9.4626 ∗∗
(1.0362) (4.8085) (17.7560) (4.6913) (17.4796) (0.8485) (4.3336) (4.1665) 
Lagged HHI 2 −1110.4260 ∗∗∗ −1081.2070 ∗ −1402.0231 ∗∗∗ −1394.8592 ∗∗ −310.3817 ∗∗ −459.8112 ∗∗∗
(156.2080) (589.6182) (184.4615) (700.8128) (142.7130) (161.0837) 
Lagged MS −12.0701 −15.1453 
(23.6434) (24.8670) 
Lagged SoW −1.8946 ∗∗∗ −1.9440 −0.9709 ∗∗∗
(0.3977) (1.4847) (0.2800) 
Number of observations 245,178 245,178 239,537 245,178 239,537 245,179 245,179 245,179 
R -squared 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006 0.0006 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 
Adjusted R -squared 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006 0.0006 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 
Panel B: NHHI results 
Lagged NHHI 7.8880 ∗∗∗ 46.4840 ∗∗∗ 45.7624 ∗∗ 44.3478 ∗∗∗ 44.2149 ∗∗ 2.9822 ∗∗∗ 12.4672 ∗∗ 11.4107 ∗∗
(1.2448) (5.4655) (20.1084) (5.4142) (20.0634) (0.9912) (4.9857) (4.9085) 
Lagged NHHI 2 −1468.6397 ∗∗∗ −1452.2241 ∗ −1884.2091 ∗∗∗ −1917.8119 ∗∗ −360.9219 ∗ −566.4512 ∗∗∗
(204.1014) (766.9316) (244.4729) (922.9258) (187.9899) (213.4361) 
Lagged MS −11.3222 −14.6674 
(23.4579) (24.8045) 
Lagged SoW −1.6200 ∗∗∗ −1.7313 −0.8012 ∗∗∗
(0.3354) (1.2683) (0.2422) 
Number of observations 245,178 245,178 239,537 245,178 239,537 245,179 245,179 245,179 
R -squared 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006 0.0006 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 
Adjusted R -squared 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006 0.0006 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
Panel C: 5FI results 
Lagged 5FI 0.7589 ∗∗∗ 5.1426 ∗∗∗ 5.1090 6.9152 ∗∗∗ 7.0271 ∗∗ 0.2624 ∗∗ 1.3057 ∗ 2.1864 ∗∗∗
(0.1499) (0.8780) (3.2665) (0.9451) (3.5546) (0.1118) (0.7587) (0.8358) 
Lagged 5FI 2 −11.3079 ∗∗∗ −11.2617 −20.0470 ∗∗∗ −20.4280 ∗ −2.6911 −7.0332 ∗∗∗
(2.2138) (8.3831) (2.8461) (10.8268) (1.9786) (2.4875) 
Lagged MS −9.9791 −14.8748 
(23.0337) (24.8087) 
Lagged SoW −1.8969 ∗∗∗ −1.9487 −0.9425 ∗∗∗
(0.3570) (1.3386) (0.2559) 
Number of observations 245,178 245,178 239,537 245,178 239,537 245,179 245,179 245,179 
R -squared 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0006 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 
Adjusted R -squared 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0006 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of the second-order term is significantly negative. This re-
sult is robust to including lagged market share and lagged
AFMI size as controls. This suggests that the effect of con-
centration is distinct from the effect of decreasing returns
to scale at the fund and industry levels. To control for
the possibility of unaccounted common factors in the es-
timated net alphas, we also use PC-adjusted fund net al-
phas as the dependent variable (Panel B) and find similar
results. 
The main result of this table is that fund net alphas,
on average, are increasing concave in AFMI concentration.
Our theoretical results indicate that, for plausible parame-
ter values, higher levels of AFMI concentration induce in-
creases in gross alpha production opportunities that are
higher than those in managers’ effort costs. 
Table 4 analyzes the relation between AFMI active
share, AFMI tracking error, and AFMI concentration. WePlease cite this article as: D. Feldman, K. Saxena and J. Xu, Is the
Journal of Financial Economics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2find support for prediction 3, in that active share increases
with all measures of concentration we consider. The rela-
tion with tracking error is less robust. This could reflect
that the relation between concentration and effort is more
due to the effort involved in stock picking (as measured
by active share), rather than the effort involved in factor
timing (as measured by tracking error). Given the difficul-
ties in measuring effort, we leave a more fuller analysis
of the relation between effort and concentration for future
research. 
4.1. Robustness 
In addition to the reported tables, we examine the sen-
sitivity of the results in Table 3 by using fund fixed effect
regressions instead of the RD method. Most of the results
are consistent, except when regressing the PC-adjusted active fund management industry concentrated enough? 
019.08.009 
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Table 4 
Industry-level analysis: active fund management industry (AFMI) active share, tracking error, and AFMI concentration. 
This table reports the results of the main equations in various vector autoregression models, in which AFMI active share, AS , and AFMI tracking error, 
TE , are dependent variables. The sample period is from 1980 to 2009, and the frequency is quarterly. AS is measured as the average active share of active 
funds (in Antti Petajisto’s database, www.petajisto.net/data.html ) in a quarter. TE is calculated as the average tracking error of active funds in a quarter. 
HHI, NHHI , and 5 FI are Herfindahl–Hirschman index, normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman index, and five-fund index, respectively. Eqs. (1) and (2) –(4) , and 
(5) and (6) report the results of the three concentration measures, HHI, NHHI , and 5 FI , respectively. Small sample-adjusted standard errors are used and 
presented in parentheses. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% significant level in a two-tail t -test, respectively. 
AS TE AS TE AS TE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged HHI 0.6279 ∗∗∗ 0.7652 ∗
(0.1865) (0.4302) 
Lagged NHHI 0.4732 ∗∗ 0.7533 
(0.2365) (0.5321) 
Lagged 5FI 0.0872 ∗∗∗ 0.0822 
(0.0284) (0.0654) 
Lagged AS 0.8979 ∗∗∗ −0.0971 0.9430 ∗∗∗ −0.0590 0.9023 ∗∗∗ −0.0680 
(0.0315) (0.0728) (0.0283) (0.0637) (0.0326) (0.0751) 
Lagged TE −0.0299 0.7111 ∗∗∗ −0.0111 0.7297 ∗∗∗ −0.0165 0.7319 ∗∗∗
(0.0280) (0.0645) (0.0279) (0.0627) (0.0272) (0.0628) 
Constant 0.0753 ∗∗∗ 0.0884 0.0406 ∗ 0.0577 0.0631 ∗∗∗ 0.0587 
(0.0240) (0.0554) (0.0212) (0.0476) (0.0224) (0.0516) 
Number of observations 118 118 118 118 118 118 
R -squared 0.969 0.574 0.967 0.570 0.968 0.569 
 
 
 
fund net alpha on AFMI concentration measures. We find 
that the significance of AFMI concentration measure is re- 
duced. We also analyze whether our results are driven by 
small funds. We redo our main analyses using observa- 
tions after restricting our sample to funds with a net as- 
set value above $15 million in any month of our sample 
period. Again, we find consistent results. To test whether 
our main results are stable across subsamples, we redo our 
analyses for three subperiods. We find a significantly pos- 
itive relation between fund net alphas and lagged HHI in 
all three subperiods. 
5. Conclusion 
We introduce a model in which optimal fund man- 
ager effort to find mispriced assets influences AFMI size 
and performance for a continuum of AFMI concentration 
levels. While models that focus on decreasing returns to 
scale suggest that AFMI performance must be low in an 
economy with a massive AFMI, our model says that, even 
in such an AFMI, if managers exert more effort, they can 
achieve higher net alpha. 
Increased effort productivity and lower effort costs in- 
centivize managers to exert more effort. We identify an 
equilibrium in which less competition (or more concentra- 
tion) leads to improved productivity and lowers costs. If a 
higher concentration results in lower search costs or more 
unexplored investment opportunities, per manager and per 
dollar of AUM, it provides stronger managerial incentives 
to exert effort. According to our model, this higher concen- 
tration could be due to a wider distribution of fund man- 
ager skills, with some highly skilled managers allocated a 
sizable proportion of the AFMI AUM. (We allow for ex- 
ogenous AFMI concentration to accommodate other forces 
that influence the competitive environment or increases 
optimal effort such as technological advances or regulatory 
changes.) In our model, increases in fund managers’ efforts Please cite this article as: D. Feldman, K. Saxena and J. Xu, Is the
Journal of Financial Economics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2improve AFMI performance and increase its size, even at 
elevated levels of AUM. 
This model reproduces several empirical regularities 
and makes new predictions. We test these new predictions 
using US mutual fund data and find that, on average, AFMI 
net alphas, size, and effort (proxied by active share and 
tracking error) are increasing concave with AFMI concen- 
tration. Additional tests using natural experiments (with 
exogenous changes in concentration levels) and better data 
(e.g., direct measures of effort) are left for future research. 
While our findings identify the AFMI’s performance and 
direct benefits sensitivities to concentration, because we 
model a partial equilibrium, statements regarding general 
societal benefits will have to wait for future research. If 
we hypothesize AFMI’s gains to be coming mainly from 
noise or liquidity traders and from disciplining firms to- 
ward higher managerial productivity, one would have to 
model those to be confident about policy implications with 
respect to general societal welfare. In view of our findings, 
we suggest that regulators act judiciously when regulating 
AFMI concentration. Future research could also extend our 
analysis to international fund markets, pension funds, and 
hedge funds. 
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